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Efforts to understand modern intrastate conflict require examination of the varied 
interactions between states and non-state entities battling for control of government. A 
growing number of civil wars and separatist conflicts, particularly following the end of the 
Cold War, have been resolved peacefully through negotiated settlements in which rebels 
abandoned their arms and entered the political arena. While many scholars have studied 
revolution and democratization in depth, few have focused on explaining the transformation 
of rebel movements into political parties. Under what conditions do rebel movements 
engaged in armed conflict with states decide to negotiate, disarm and participate in electoral 
politics? The analysis relies on historical narrative and process-tracing to uncover complex, 
interactive causal mechanisms beyond the purely rationalist motives of rebels and régimes. 
This qualitative study analyzes two revolutionary groups that transformed from 
violent combatants into political actors in transitions from civil wars–the ZANU/ZAPU 
movement in Zimbabwe and the FMLN in El Salvador. Three factors–a) the nature and 
extent of international influence on the rebels, b) the rebels’ level of popular support and c) 
the type of electoral system are hypothesized to impact rebels’ decisions. The study examines 
the shifting mobilization strategies of violent revolutionary groups–and their effects–given 
particular material and non-material incentives and the interaction of the interests and 
identities of domestic and international actors in the civil war context. Building on the 
existing theoretical literature on social revolution, democratization and the participation of 
“outsiders” in electoral politics, the study of rebels’ decision-making in civil wars is 
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1 Deconstructing Rebels into Politicians: Research Problem 
  and Methodology 
 
 Much of the scholarship on conflict termination over the past several decades has 
examined the theoretical consequences of different elements of the process: for example, the 
viability of power-sharing arrangements, the role of peacekeeping in maintaining stability and 
the durability of civil war settlements. Another subset of the literature has explored 
revolution, transitions to democracy and attempts to understand these processes through 
political and economic development models. A crucial intersection of these branches of the 
literature–post-conflict transitions to peaceful societies and democratic governance–has been 
less clearly mapped. This developing thread of scholarship has incorporated elements of 
multiple, overlapping fields, including conflict resolution and management, state-building, 
diplomacy and post-war reconstruction. Scholars employing this integrated perspective 
examine the political and institutional dynamics involved in achieving sustainable peace and 
stability in societies severely damaged by conflict–and the impetus for moving away from 
violence to politics as a means of struggle. One aspect of this transition is a particular 
process: the incorporation of armed opposition movements into national political systems–
negotiated during peace processes and consolidated through a power-sharing government or 
electoral contest. 
In this analysis I examine the roles of political incentives and the use of violence in 
relations among states and non-state domestic actors. Under what conditions do rebel 
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movements engaged in violent conflict with states decide to disarm and participate as 
political actors? Through a qualitative study based on two case studies, I intend to examine 
situations in which revolutionary groups opted to transform from active engagement in 
violent struggle to incorporation as political parties. 
First, I hypothesize that the nature and degree of the support of international actors 
influence the calculations of rebel groups to disarm and enter politics. If rebels anticipate 
declining international support for their violent means, they will be more likely to alter their 
strategy and consider political struggle. Second, the level of popular support and political 
coalitions the rebel group has secured and anticipates has a distinct impact on its decision-
making process. Rebel movements with greater, more diffuse popular support and intra-
system political alliances anticipate successful transitions to legitimate political parties, in 
both electoral competitions and power-sharing roles. Third, I hypothesize that the greater 
the flexibility of a country’s electoral system in creating incentives for rebels’ political 
participation–as well as in providing assurances of electoral support to the régime–the higher 
the likelihood that rebels will willingly commit to disarmament and transformation. The type 
of electoral system, whether closed- or open-list proportional representation, alternative vote 
or another form, will shape the options and limitations that rebels encounter in acceding to 
electoral politics–and the demands and concessions they make. 
Robert Dahl argued in 1971 that the electoral incorporation of a régime’s opponents 
would become more likely as the cost of tolerance of the opposition came to be lower than 
the costs to the régime of continued suppression of armed opposition. In addition to the 
régime’s strategic considerations, these transitions rely equally on the rebels’ perceptions of 
incentives and opportunities. How rebel leadership and the rank-and-file view the decision 
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to enter politics and their electoral prospects–and the sustainability of such a shift in 
strategy–is critical to understanding the varying significance of institutions, civilian support 
and regional and international influences on actors in the conflict. Dahl emphasized the 
purposive steps that government and opposition actors seeking “mutual security guarantees” 
may take to mitigate the costs of conflict (1971), that is, negotiating the democratic ‘rules of 
the game’ in an effort to achieve coexistence amid incompatabilities. The systemic 
opportunities and circumstances under which rebels see it in their interest to compete 
politically–and the extent to which and manner in which they disarm, as well as the 
prospects of international support or legitimization rebels may receive as signatories of a 
ceasefire agreement or peace accord–affect the sustainability or failure of the rebellion-to-
politics transition. 
The circumstances surrounding a rebel movement’s decision to enter politics–
including but not limited to international influence, characteristics of national political 
institutions and level of popular support for the rebels–have a traceable impact on the 
strategy’s success. A more nuanced understanding of the reasons that insurgents enter 
politics will contribute to potential explanations for variations in rebel groups’ political 
status–whether or not they become functioning parties–and in the stability of peace, 
following a range of internal conflicts from the end of World War II to the present. 
The second half of the twentieth century provides ample internal conflicts in many 
regions where post-conflict political processes formed part of a “transition to democracy” or 
a move away from authoritarian rule–in some cases to another undemocratic régime. A 
scarcity of cases is not the explanation for a gap in the literature on the effect of anti-state 
actors on institutionalized democracy, or vice versa. The decolonization period which gained 
4 
 
steam after World War II and reached well into the 1960s and 1970s includes independence 
struggles that spawned victorious movements as well as internal and external secessionist 
and identity-based tensions that persist today. Rebel-to-politician transitions can be fruitfully 
examined within a variety of internal conflict types. The ethnic conflicts found, for instance, 
in the Balkans and some African societies, and historically intractable conflicts, for example, 
the Palestinian-Israeli standoff, highlight the importance of understanding factors intrinsic to 
identity-based conflict–religious, ethnic and linguistic commonalities, territorial claims and 
claims to sovereignty that determine the success or failure of political efforts undertaken by 
rebel groups. The resolution of separatist conflicts, for example in Iraq, Turkey, India, 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Spain, highlight questions about the role of power-sharing 
governments, constitutional engineering and institutional design in analyzing transitions to 
peaceful politics. 
 
Review of the Literature: Rebellion to Elections; Social Revolution; Democratization 
Delving into an exploration of the conditions under which rebel groups decide to 
demobilize and enter politics requires an examination of existing scholarship on the theories 
that explain the outcomes of revolutionary aspirations that succeed or fail during–or after–
internal conflict. The opportunities for theory-building in this underexplored area are many: 
for example, on the role of international mediators as agents in the processes that bring 
internal actors to the negotiating table and toward a political settlement of civil war. My 
objective is to build on past analyses and that of the extant literature on revolution and 
democratization, placing insurgents in intrastate conflict and elections firmly within the 
“political development” aspects of peace-building. 
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The Literature on Transitions from Violent Revolution to Elections 
By definition, the wide-ranging literature on democracy emphasizes the inherent 
importance of electoral institutions and free and fair public participation in government. In 
the post-Cold War era, analysts advocate that this tenet at the heart of representative 
democracy is the only tested route to just and sustainable government. Scholars seek to 
understand why this is so, and in what historical circumstances–and how–democratic 
institutions fulfill the competing aims of both the powerful and the power-seekers. As a 
fundamental basis for understanding why elections are a legitimate means of incorporating 
rebel movements into semi-democratic or democratizing governmental structures in post-
conflict settings–and why groups might choose this strategy over persisting in waging war–
the democracy literature is relevant because it stresses the significance of political processes 
and institutions, regardless of who holds power or who desires it. 
The more recent and specific literature on transformation of revolutionary groups 
into viable political players (Ryan 1994; Shugart 1992; Söderberg Kovacs 2007; de Zeeuw 
2008) stresses several factors that emerge during negotiation processes as determinant of 
rebels’ successful incorporation into the political system. These include the extent to which 
disarmament occurs; the terms of ceasefires and agreements; the nature of a state’s particular 
electoral system and its capacity to provide sufficient guarantees of potential gains in 
representation for rebels; and institutional reforms that alter the layout of the political field, 
such as constitutional or electoral system changes. Some analysts, including Shugart and 
Ryan, purport that the level of pre-election mass mobilization achieved by the rebels affects 
their prospects for post-transition coalition-building and successful electoral participation. 
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This assessment coincides with the conclusions of some scholars who have studied 
social revolution. Goodwin and Skocpol (1994) argue that the structures of states and 
militaries, in addition to the level of political mobilization of various sectors of society, are 
critical to explaining revolutions in developing countries. The more exclusionary and less 
connected the state is to the populace, the higher the likelihood that a revolutionary 
movement will succeed. “When civil society as a whole can be politically mobilized to 
oppose an autonomous and narrowly based direct colonial régime or a Sultanistic neo-
patrimonial régime,” Goodwin and Skocpol argued, rebel groups have a greater chance to 
succeed. Their post-war political prospects are similarly shaped by the extent of their 
consistent mobilization of a wide, mass base. Ryan emphasizes the importance of the 
political coalitions that rebels develop prior to disarmament and elections, in addition to the 
degree of widespread mobilization of the electorate that in large part determines the success 
of the movement as the transition progresses. 
Shugart adopts a rational choice perspective of the institutional circumstances that 
permit guerrillas to become significant actors, citing Giovanni Sartori’s concept of a 
“relevant party” (Sartori 1976)–one that has coalition or blackmail potential, that is, the 
ability to participate in executive power or to deny votes to another party that will not join a 
coalition with it (Shugart 1992, 122). The relevance of Dahl’s argument is clear: the electoral 
incorporation of a given régime’s opponents is more likely as the costs to the régime of 
continued suppression or violent opposition surpass the cost of tolerance of the rebels. 
Democratization becomes particularly significant insofar as it entails mechanisms for 
reconfiguring the environment within which political competition takes place (Ryan 1994, 
30). The degree to which the emerging democratic system is more incorporating than the 
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system it displaces is critical to the revolutionaries’ ability to secure sufficient social space 
and build political coalitions (Baloyra 1987). Changes to state institutions may shape the 
costs to the régime and the rebels of either continuation of the conflict or acceptance of 
electoral competition. Shugart argues that the nature of the conflict, terms of the ceasefire 
and institutional reforms influence the costs of embracing electoral competition or 
continuing the war. 
In Rhodesia in 1979, the costs of continuing the eight-year conflict changed for the 
warring parties–the ZANU/ZAPU liberation movements and the Rhodesian government–
allowing the rebels to benefit from their distinct military advantage over the régime and 
compete in an election with the overwhelming support of a large majority of the population. 
Due to this imbalance, as Shugart suggests, institutional guarantees were made to the 
Rhodesian government to lower the cost of its tolerating rebel participation in the system 
through negotiations of the Lancaster House Constitution. These guarantees ensured an 
overrepresentation of the white minority in the assembly. ZANU received assurances in the 
form of an armed Commonwealth election monitoring force; more than 22,000 
ZANU/ZAPU rebels mostly complied with disarmament as a condition for the continued 
support of important allies Britain, Mozambique and South Africa (Shugart 1992, 131-3). 
Revolutions and social movements–and the role of the state 
The prolific literature on revolution focuses not only on its origins and causes but on 
explanations of its outcomes. Skocpol argued in States and Social Revolutions (1979) that the 
state should be at the center of analysis of social rebellions, which cannot occur without the 
breakdown of the administrative and coercive powers of the régime. Skocpol concluded that 
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autocratic, partially bureaucratized monarchies were transformed through state breakdowns, 
elite conflicts and popular revolts into more centralized, bureaucratic, “national states” 
(Skocpol 1994, 5). This process alone does not explain social revolutions, however, and an 
emphasis on the state (and state-society relations) cannot fully comprehend the success of 
social movements: a focus on “international and world-historical contexts” (8) is necessary 
to analyze the conflicts and outcomes that social movements generate. Transnational 
influences, including economic opportunities and competition among states cannot be 
neglected in attempts to explain outcomes of social movements. 
Another contribution of States and Social Revolutions is its attention to a “structural 
perspective on sociocultural reality” (Skocpol 1979, 18), an approach that emphasizes the 
importance of how revolutions emerge and become situated within and shaped by 
institutional factors–rather than prevailing through the use of collective social wills 
consolidated by a single group, ideology, class interest, or mass psychology. The roles that 
revolutionary leaders assume as “marginal elites” amid moments of state breakdown–and 
their capacity to generate political mobilization during critical, formative periods–determine 
their significance in constructing new structures in a state-building process. These 
conclusions were among the precursors of the prevailing literature on rebel-to-party 
transformations. 
Securing geographical and political space is crucial to the development and 
sustainability of guerrilla movements, particularly those undertaken in poor, rural settings 
like Latin America in the 1950s through the 1970s, where various revolutionary groups 
formed and failed to consolidate power–with the exceptions of rebels in Cuba in 1959 and in 
Nicaragua two decades later. Wickham-Crowley (1992) emphasizes this precondition for the 
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success of revolutionaries, stressing that active peasant and rural support is essential to the 
survival of rebel movements. He concludes that foreign aid to guerrillas–whether from 
Moscow, Havana or elsewhere–or to the régimes being contested is not a determinant 
factor. Wickham-Crowley focuses on régime type and the régime’s links to society as the 
combined most powerful factor, citing the irreparably damaging impact of corrupt, 
personalistic dictatorships that undermine elites, state infrastructure and security forces. In 
Cuba and Nicaragua, when dictators Batista and Somoza were forced out of office, the 
governments were left vulnerable to rebel takeover. In contrast, Wickham-Crowley argues, 
bureaucratic, “collectivist-authoritarian régimes” (Skocpol 1994, 311) in Latin America have 
been able to combat guerrilla incursions more readily as a result of maintaining some 
alliances with middle and upper class groups. Competition for the support of the masses is a 
critical determinant of not only revolutionary success but the perceptions and prospects of 
rebels faced with a set of strategic moves including entry into political struggle. 
Huntington (1968) argued that successful great revolutions do not occur in 
democratically elected systems, stressing the significance of régime type in effecting 
transitions. Ryan, however, suggests that a stable democracy is not inherently immune from 
the dangers of revolutionary penetration; any régime, democratic or not, that enjoys the 
support of some key sectors of society and the acquiescence of others will pose a challenge 
to a revolutionary movement (1994, 29). State-centered arguments that stress rebel groups’ 
societal relations do not break from earlier ideas about the importance of rural populations 
in fomenting revolutionary struggle. 
Recent studies of civil war and political violence by Kalyvas (2003) and Wood (2003) 
suggest that popular support cannot be categorized as “for or against” the rebels or régime, 
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but understanding its forms and effects requires fine-grained analytical tools–including an 
appropriate combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as narrative, 
historical-based approaches–to uncover the nature, evolution and changeable motivations of 
civilian support. Collective and selective incentives provided by guerrillas to the populations 
within which they hide and operate vary according to whether a conflict has ethnic, racial or 
religious dimensions, entail territorial claims or contestation over natural resources. 
Weinstein’s analysis (2007) of the internal politics of rebel movements–in Uganda, 
Mozambique and two factions of the Shining Path in Peru–based on the nature of their 
strategic interactions with civilian populations is a critical addition to the literature on 
deconstructing rebels’ varied relationships with constituents. Rebels’ use of violence against 
civilians as a means of securing or enforcing popular backing or gaining access to resources 
plays a significant role in determining the type of civilian support the movement receives and 
how it translates when conflict shifts to the electoral arena. 
The use of violence emerges clearly in conflict as one means to achieve legitimacy 
among a population that a rebel group purports to represent. Johan Galtung’s notion of the 
“violence of the status quo” (1969, 171-176)–that ingrained, structural inequality amounts to 
an avoidable injustice and therefore to violence–is evident in exclusionary, anti-reformist 
state policies. The strategic waging of war against the state by insurgents on the territory of 
indigenous peoples, ostensibly on behalf of their marginalized interests–for example in 
Guatemala in the 1960s–illustrates the culture of violence that can envelope all pockets of 
society in internal conflict. By not legitimizing their own struggle for influence in diverse 
civilian sectors through political means, the Guatemalan URNG guerrillas’ initial, military-
based strategy lacked the force to counter a state apparatus defined by terror. The 
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subsequent co-option by the rebels of peasants in the northern and western highlands–
traditionally marginalized and discriminated against through Galtung’s “structural violence”–
resulted in indiscriminate, brutal massacres of indigenous peasants and sustained the cycle of 
genocidal war that dominated the country for a decade. The URNG’s failure to mobilize 
indigenous groups to support the guerrilla party in post-conflict elections resulted in its 
inability to transform into a viable political actor following the 1996 peace accords. 
The case of Guatemala is unique in that it demonstrates that rebels’ efforts to co-opt 
the peasantry during the conflict period may not enhance the group’s future electoral 
prospects. The rebels’ wartime efforts to exploit the rural population as a base–in addition to 
the impetus of a national peace dialogue–served to initiate democratizing forces, including 
the organization and political participation of indigenous, minority, and land rights groups. 
Amid the complex backdrop of a comprehensive peace agreement, this developing social 
pluralism served perhaps to alter and broaden the social structures of an evolving political 
system rather than encourage direct constituencies of indigenous or other minority groups to 
vote for the guerrilla coalition. 
The importance of political coalition-building is clear in the literature on 
revolutionary success and failure–and the extent of the coalition’s reach across 
socioeconomic strata plays a significant role. In State and Revolution in the Third World (1988), 
Goodwin argues that when a revolutionary group is able to build a mass base that takes into 
account the urban, middle classes and upper-class elites–not only the rural peasantry–its 
chances of eventually taking state power are higher. Using case studies from Central America 
and Southeast Asia, Goodwin qualifies this argument, adding that historical factors also 
matter. Whether the state was a directly or indirectly ruled colony determines whether or not 
12 
 
the rebels can exploit popular support for a national liberation movement in the face of a 
narrow, repressive régime. In his state-centered analysis, régime type plays a large role in 
helping to determine the breadth of the coalition that the guerrillas are able to muster, but 
equally significant is the level of inclusion and room for even nominal reforms permitted by 
the régime. 
Democratization and transitions 
 Incorporating democracy–or more precisely, democratization–into a theoretical 
discussion of actors waging armed conflict becoming actors engaged in political contests is a 
natural next step. Elections allow rebel combatants an alternative forum if they perceive or 
can manipulate incentives to participate. In immediate post-conflict settings, the legitimizing 
potential of elections and electoral institutions provides fundamental opportunities for elites 
and “insurgent counter-elites” (Wood 2000) to arrange conditions and propose reforms to 
the political system, particularly in societies in which minority populations (in the case of 
Zimbabwe and other African societies, the black majority) have traditionally been 
marginalized. “If one wants to change the nature of a particular democracy, the electoral 
system is likely to be the most suitable and effective instrument for doing so” (Lijphart 1995, 
412). 
The literature on democratization and transitions from authoritarian rule argues that 
these transformations are influenced by the nature and institutional structures of the old 
régime. Linz, Stepan and Karl, among others, point to “path dependency” and “contingent 
choice” as formative elements of régime transition. In transitional phases, characteristics of 
the previous administration in large part determine the political, social and systemic 
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structures within which new actors construct goals and strategies. Extending this reasoning 
to recent post-conflict transitions, Lyons (2005) argues that following a period of state failure 
or protracted civil war, the transition is characterized both by the distortion or breakdown of 
peacetime political institutions and social structures and by the alternative structures that 
arise during conflict, based on the use of violence toward accumulation of and sustaining 
power. 
Scholars who study the political economy of civil war point to these “trajectories of 
accumulation” (Cramer 2008) that develop during conflict and at least in part determine the 
political, economic and institutional mechanisms of the transition, for example, whether 
trade in weapons or drugs will continue to drive the post-war economy. This conclusion 
suggests that the nature of the interim régime that attempts to implement a peaceful 
transition is critical to the long-term prospects for stable governance and peace because it 
determines the norms, precedents and structural frameworks that steer the post-conflict 
transition (Lyons 2004, 270-272). 
Certainly not the first to stress the link between democratization and conflict, 
Rustow points to “entrenched and serious conflict”–specifically political conflict–as a basis 
for the genesis of procedural democracy (1970, 361). An analysis of the conditions leading to 
revolutionary groups’ disarmament and political incorporation will add to the current 
literature on conflict termination and post-war peace-building, even as additional factors–
international humanitarian intervention, United Nations peacekeeping operations, intrastate 
battles over valuable resources and many others–influence outcomes. This kind of research 
will require understanding more clearly and with greater nuance the various factors that drive 
rebels off the battlefield and into the parliament, including: the type of electoral system; 
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availability of domestic institutional and political reforms during peace negotiations; rebels’ 
pre-transition political coalitions; and the rebels’ internal decision making approaches. 
 
Preliminary Hypotheses 
Studying a range of internal and external factors that incentivize the termination of 
conflict and the initiation of peace processes has shaped my hypotheses regarding the 
determinants of rebel incorporation as political parties. First, I hypothesize that the nature 
and extent of support from international actors significantly influence the calculations of 
rebel groups to abandon armed struggle and enter politics. The strategies and strength of 
external actors–for example, the United Nations, the United States and regional powers–vary 
depending on the global context and their particular interest in a given conflict or state. The 
bipolar international system from 1945 to 1989 and the post-Cold War structure shaped the 
incentives and assistance that international actors, who at times pursued their own interests 
by intervening in intrastate conflicts, providing critical support to revolutionary groups and 
régimes. External actors’ varied involvement may encourage rebels to perpetuate violent 
wars or terminate them by disarming and settling differences politically. If rebels anticipate 
declining international support–in the form of weapons, money or manpower–for their 
participation in the conflict, they are more likely to alter their strategy and consider entering 
politics. If demobilization is likely to ensure the maintenance of backing by regional or 
international actors, rebel groups are more disposed to forgo violence. 
Second, the level of popular support that a rebel group garners and the political 
coalitions it builds have a distinct impact on its decision-making process. A rebel 
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movement’s “analytical imagination” (R. George 2008) –the degree to which it calculates, 
given incomplete or imperfect information, that it may or may not succeed, based on for 
example, its assessment of how it has mobilized the masses is sufficient to secure a 
reasonable number of parliamentary seats or for it to act as a spoiler (or prevail) in a 
presidential competition, then it may choose to enter the race (Shugart 1992, 122). If a group 
agrees or is pressured to enter an election by internal or external forces and later anticipates a 
weak performance at the polls, it may renege on disarmament or other ceasefire 
commitments, distorting the peace-building process. In addition, different groups have 
achieved varying kinds of strategic alliances with existing political parties or coalitions in a 
given domestic political arena. Rebel movements with greater, more diffuse popular support 
and intra-system political alliances will fare better in their transitions to legitimate political 
parties, in both electoral competitions and power-sharing roles. 
A rebel movement’s calculations about its own popular backing are directly related to 
the type of electoral system in place–and the potential for domestic political reforms to 
mitigate the costs to the rebels and the régime of political competition versus continuing the 
conflict. Institutional engineering of the electoral system may be an instrument of third-party 
mediators to shape possibilities and progress during mediation efforts. The kind of electoral 
system, whether closed- or open-list proportional representation, alternative vote, or another 
form will shape the options and limitations that rebels have in acceding to electoral politics–
and the demands and concessions they make. The ability of a political system to 
accommodate “outsiders”–in this case, a former insurgent group–has been linked in the 
literature to its level of democracy. 
16 
 
Third, I hypothesize that the greater the flexibility of the electoral system in creating 
incentives for rebels’ political participation–as well as in providing assurances to the régime–
the higher the likelihood that rebels will commit to disarmament and transformation. If a 
rebel group negotiates an opportunity to secure a meaningful stake in government through 
electoral competition–often generated through alterations to the electoral system or the 
apportionment of legislative seats, or a guaranteed role in rewriting a constitution–it is likely 
to agree to enter the political ring, thereby changing the “rules of the game” and increasing 
its leverage indefinitely. Political incentives and compromises have long-term effects on 
stabilizing peace and creating sound institutions in an established political system or one 
being rebuilt in a post-war period. 
I hypothesize that these three factors are central in determining whether rebels 
become active participants in the political system. The conditions under which rebels make 
decisions depend on many factors, for example, the status of the military conflict and the 
demographic, ethnic and religious composition of society. Other elements, including the 
(ideological, political or economic) purpose of the rebel group may shape the outlook for 
rebel transformation. Studying a rebel group’s structural organization may demonstrate how 
a shift to political struggle might affect both internal power equations and potential electoral 
performance. Finally, political psychology may be useful in analyzing the role of elites–rebel 
and régime leaders, as well as third-party mediators–and how they perceive that their 






The multiple case study method will enhance my empirical research design in ways 
that a large-N, quantitative study cannot; a qualitative approach will highlight the 
particularities of the cases while permitting contingent generalizations. George and Bennett 
describe the case study approach as the development and testing of a historical explanation 
of an historical episode that may be generalizable to other events (2005, 5). The “structured, 
focused comparison” of case study analysis may facilitate the emergence of new hypotheses. 
The phenomenon of rebels becoming parties has not been widely analyzed; my preliminary 
approach to studying the patterns and causal relationships involved, then, will most usefully 
be an in-depth analysis and comparison of two case studies–the FMLN in El Salvador and 
the ZANU/ZAPU guerrilla coalition in Rhodesia, known as the Patriotic Front (PF) during 
the latter part of the war and peace negotiations. 
Methodology. The outcome of interest in the study is the decision of rebel elites to seek 
incorporation into the political system through an end to armed struggle. I am aiming to 
explain rebel leaders’ decisions through examination of three independent variables in order 
to elucidate the conditions which permit and encourage the decision to explore political 
struggle. The two cases entail a “most similar” case study design in that both the FMLN and 
the PF successfully transformed into political parties following resolutions of civil 
incompatibilities over control of government. 
In selecting independent variables I have attempted to take into account the most 
outstanding causal elements of these transitions in El Salvador and Zimbabwe. The 
significance of these factors has been outlined in detail in the previous sections on the 
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background and research to date on the subject. The first variable is the level of the rebels’ 
pre-transition popular support and political coalitions. This will be assessed through reading 
historical accounts of the amount and kind of support insurgents have built during internal 
conflict–how pervasive this popular backing is in different parts of the country–and the 
nature of alliances they have forged with other existing political parties. News reports, public 
statements and interviews will also be helpful in assessing popular support. 
The second independent variable, the electoral system type, is critical to 
understanding the institutional and systemic opportunities available to shape incentives and 
guarantees for the rebels and the régime–and the prospects for electoral incorporation of 
rebel groups. In addition to a working knowledge of accounts in the literature of particular 
electoral contests in El Salvador and Zimbabwe, familiarization with different electoral 
systems and their benefits and disadvantages will be essential to assessing their significance 
in these transitions. 
Third, the level and nature of international support during conflict and peace 
processes are significant indicators of the political, financial and military support that shapes 
rebel groups’ decisions to end the war. For each case, the question might be asked: who 
(what regional and international forces) has a stake in the outcome of the conflict, and 
through what means and actors have they shaped the capabilities of either the rebels or the 
government? Particularly given the time periods of the two conflicts (Zimbabwe, 1966-1979; 
El Salvador, 1980-1989) and their relation to Cold War geopolitical positioning, this requires 
examining to what extent international donors; the United States and the former Soviet 
Union; colonial powers; the United Nations and other international mediators; and 
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bordering states have played a role in influencing political transitions in conflict-ridden 
societies. 
In formulating an approach that seeks to integrate description of the conflicts and 
post-war transitions with analysis, the structure of the case studies will include first a 
summary of conflict dynamics and the peace process, taking into account the importance of 
historical narrative; an examination of the presence and relative importance of each of the 
three independent variables in significantly greater depth; and a set of analytical conclusions 
that can be drawn based on comparisons within each case. Within-case analysis and process 
tracing–a methodological tool that seeks to uncover the micro-foundations of individual 
decision processes and behavior–will help generate a clearer map of complex dynamics of 
the transition of rebels to politicians (George and Bennett 2005). These methods emphasize 
uncovering the precise routes of causal mechanisms within causal relationships to determine 
how and why particular outcomes occur. Qualitative approaches are particularly useful in 
this study because they help to examine variation in the three independent variables in each 
case over time. By identifying causal variables, process tracing aids in theory construction–a 
primary goal of the study. 
Selection of cases. The Zimbabwean liberation movement came to power during the 
decolonization period through a peace agreement and subsequent “independence election,” 
and the FMLN negotiated a peace accord with the Salvadoran government as the Soviet 
Union collapsed. The transitions transpired in two different historical periods and on 
different continents, and while third-party mediation was present in both cases, Great Britain 
intervened in Zimbabwe and the United Nations in El Salvador. 
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The conflicts and transitions in El Salvador and Zimbabwe share several elements 
that allows for fruitful juxtaposition of the cases. Land was a critical basis for mobilization 
by the rebels in both conflicts, in addition to the struggle for greater political inclusion and 
rights. As a result, some strategies of the rebel movements converge; in other ways, their 
mobilization tactics differ. In Zimbabwe, the rebels’ relationship to the people entailed 
building local forms of political organization but relied heavily on intimidation and violence 
to recruit soldiers to the guerrilla forces and ensure popular backing. The FMLN rebels took 
advantage of the burgeoning social structures of the campesinos who had organized on the 
basis of land reform, occasionally employing force against civilians.  
Data and Sources. In originally exploring the idea for the study, I compiled exhaustive 
data on the outcomes of intrastate conflicts from 1946 to 2005–whether the rebels became 
political parties by defeating the government militarily or as a result of a peace accord or 
power-sharing agreement, were defeated entirely or continued in some form following a 
conflict. I chose this time period because it provides a wide range of civil wars, struggles for 
independence and secessionist conflicts in every region of the world. The data consisted of: a 
list of civil wars during that time period; a list of power-sharing agreements; a list of all 
revolutionary groups that fought against governments and the outcomes of the struggles. 
Subsequently I compiled a list of political parties that were formed during transitions from 
civil war. 
Additionally, I gathered supplementary data on the nature of ceasefire agreements 
and the degrees to which they have been implemented; the level of rebel disarmament prior 
to, during and following the first post-conflict election; régime types of contested 
governments; and structural (constitutional or electoral) reforms made as part of rebel-
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government negotiation processes. In ruling out the idea of a large-N study of the effect of 
these factors on successful rebel incorporation as political parties, I decided to focus on why 
and how the complex political, social and structural dynamics of internal conflict shape 
incentives for rebels and régimes to make significant shifts in strategies to gain or maintain 
control of government. 
Information from secondary sources, journal articles, books and academic analyses 
has guided many of my assumptions and hypotheses and comprises much of my historical 
knowledge. Data on the electoral systems of different states and changes to those systems 
over time are available from International IDEA. Election result and political party 
composition data is available from government electoral commissions and databases devoted 
to electoral study of particular countries and regions. Ideally, I would have the opportunity 
to gather primary source material through interviews with actors in the conflicts, peace 
processes and governments under study. Negotiating and financing the requisite level of 
access to these individuals is prohibitively difficult, but their perspectives are critical to 
understanding the intricacies of decision-making in the two transitions. Instead I have relied 
on secondary sources and quantitative and qualitative analyses of war termination and peace 
negotiations. 
Several sources in the peace and conflict literature aided in my conceptualization of 
the complex phenomenon of rebels’ reconstitution as political actors. The criteria for 
defining conflict used by Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild in their study of peace stabilization 
following civil war settlements–including the number of battle-related deaths; conflict 
duration; conflict issue; and international system structure–helped me generally to broaden 
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and simultaneously sharpen my methodological approach to employing certain variables over 
others and understanding exactly what I am observing, measuring and attempting to explain. 
 
The Significance of Revolutionaries Reconstituted as Political Parties 
This study is an exploration of conflict-ridden states’ internal battles over political 
legitimacy and the relationships and institutional incentives necessary for movements 
challenging the government to shift the basis and forum for their struggle from the 
battlefield to the ballot box. In a set of cases where the rebels’ level of political support; 
international influence on the actors; and the type of electoral system vary within the conflict 
period and afterwards–and across cases–use of complex, causal mechanisms helps to 
calibrate the strength of proposed explanations for rebels’ decisions to exit violent conflict 
and enter politics. Studies that aim to identify causal mechanisms attempt to answer how and 
why a factor causes a certain outcome, not only what caused it (Dessler 1991). 
My goal is to contribute to mid-level theory on rebel-to-party transformation–and 
generally, on transitions from violence to politics–not to establish immovable causal 
relationships. This would be an impossible task given the intricate linkages among factors 
identified with the impetus and incentives for rebel movements to seek political inclusion, 
and it is not the purpose of any research or theoretical undertaking. In addition, the limits of 
inference and theory-building based on analysis of two cases are clear. While variables were 
conceptualized and hypotheses generated from a rationalist perspective, the causal 
mechanisms and intervening variables that emerge through the historical narrative and 
process-tracing may point to more constructivist-oriented findings. Politics–the waging of 
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“war by other means” in Foucault’s conception (Foucault 2003)–has consequences for 
understanding the promise and limitations of compromise and choice vested in the 
negotiating table and the “free and fair” election, in societies where bitter divisions and 
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2 The Patriotic Front: Agents of Conflict, Liberation and 
Violent Politics in Zimbabwe 
 
 
The roots of violent politics in Zimbabwe can be traced to the country’s colonial 
history, racial and ethnic divisions, and its transformative civil conflict. While race and 
ethnicity continually played a role in shaping politics and participation, international 
mediation of the conflict that ended with a peace agreement at Lancaster House in London 
laid the groundwork of the formative transition years following the 1971-1979 war of 
liberation. Black rebels waged civil conflict to combat unjust land distribution policies under 
the white minority Rhodesian government and in a struggle for political rights for the black 
majority. 
Since Zimbabwean independence from Great Britain in 1980, Robert Mugabe, then 
liberation movement leader and president for the last three decades, has attempted to 
transform Zimbabwe’s social, political and economic realities through wide-ranging reforms, 
political violence and intimidation of voters. The result has been the de-legitimization of the 
democratic system in the country, with freedom from colonial-based imperialism forming 
the background for Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party’s efforts to secure a one-party state and 
quash dissent. The all-or-nothing nature of politics in Zimbabwe has origins in colonial 
governance, marginalization of the black majority; and authoritarian regimes that have 
precluded genuine democratization. 
The Patriotic Front (PF) liberation movement in the 1960s sought to break down the 
white regime and impose majority rule amid decolonization and revolutionary struggles 
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throughout southern Africa. In 1979, a “ripe moment” (Zartman 1985) permitted the 
initiation of British-mediated peace talks and the emergence of a settlement. Under what 
conditions did the rebels decide to consider political struggle–that is, why did ZANU and 
ZAPU–the two liberation movements that together formed the PF during the war–agree to 
come to the negotiating table with their Rhodesian foes and the British, and what benefits 
did they foresee by exploring an end to armed struggle? 
In attempting to explain the PF’s willingness to terminate war through a transition to 
politics, several causal elements have been proposed: the nature and extent of international 
influence on the rebels; the flexibility of the electoral system in providing incentives to the 
rebels and the régime; and the level of rebels’ popular support and pre-transition coalitions. 
These forces bled into one another in a society polarized by race, inequality, multi-level 
battles for legitimacy, and a conflict in which an estimated 50,000 people were killed (Knox 
Chitiyo 2004, 55). The era of decolonization and Britain’s determination to become 
extricated from governance in Rhodesia lent a particular, imposed urgency to the peace 
process. The Cold War framed the geopolitical importance of southern Africa and secured 
the sustained and influential role of the United States in negotiation efforts, as well as limited 
Soviet support for the rebels. 
The explanatory power of each of the three factors in the case of the Zimbabwean 
guerrillas is evaluated below, allowing for preliminary conclusions. Efforts to build a theory 
of rebels’ transition to democratic politics depend on analysis of these and other intervening 
factors in the immediate aftermath of the peace agreement and throughout the subsequent 
three decades. First, an understanding of the conflict’s historical background and the peace 
process is necessary. The role of international actors is evaluated, followed by examinations 
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of popular support for the rebels and of the electoral system’s impact on rebel decision-
making. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the rebels’ motives and violent methods 
in their transition to politics. 
 
  
Civil Conflict in Rhodesia: A Violent Battle for Liberation and Legitimacy 
Rhodesia’s internal conflict, which began with low-intensity guerrilla violence in rural 
areas in the early- to mid-1960s, stems from an interactive set of deeply embedded causes. 
Racial divisions festered for many years before they escalated and ignited a conflict over 
access to political authority and land. Long-standing demands for representation, a role in 
government for the black majority and equitable access to land formed the crux of the 
grievances that led to the development of the black nationalist movement. The eight-year 
liberation struggle has roots in Rhodesia’s colonial era, which began in the late nineteenth 
century with conquest of the territory by British entrepreneur Cecil Rhodes. Rhodesia was 
nominally under the control of the British until 1923, when the majority of white settlers–the 
de facto rulers–voted in a referendum to institute sovereignty (Stedman 1991, 36).  
A white minority that never amounted to more than five percent of the population 
governed and systematically oppressed the black majority in the country. Through property 
and educational requirements, blacks were disenfranchised–a status that extended to social 
and economic rights (Stedman 1993, 126). Their lack of access to political power and 
productivity was most evident in the segregation of the holding of arable land legalized in 
1930. After European settlers purchased the most fertile agricultural areas, blacks divided up 
the remainder, most of which was committed to communal farming in regions called the 
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Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs). In the late 1950s the emergence of Ian Smith’s white supremacist 
Rhodesian Front movement demonstrated new levels of discrimination and marginalization 
of blacks in Rhodesian politics, exaggerated by the migration of whites from South Africa 
and the United Kingdom. 
The process of British decolonization in Africa that began in the early 1960s took 
hold of politics in Rhodesia in 1965, when Smith, then Prime Minister of the white minority 
government, declared unilateral independence (UDI) from Britain, at a time when the 
metropole had begun pressuring for majority rule. UDI may have provided the spark for the 
call to action for black guerrillas, who took up arms against the white government at the time 
the declaration was announced. When British attempts to negotiate an agreement with the 
Smith government over formal independence resulted in a proposal that would prevent 
majority rule for decades, nationalist leader Bishop Abel Muzorewa organized a broad 
popular consultation on the agreement, resulting in the measure’s defeat. For the first time, 
ordinary blacks were consulted on the future independence of the country (Stedman 1991, 
37). 
Until 1963, the liberation movements were united under one banner– Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (ZAPU). When a cadre of ZAPU executive members lost 
confidence in the leadership of Joshua Nkomo, the group formed their own break-off 
movement, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Ndabaningi Sithole was the 
founder of ZANU, later led by Robert Mugabe. The 1963 split had crucial consequences for 
the nationalist movement and politics in Zimbabwe. Politics remained divided throughout 
the liberation struggle and following the peace agreement on basically ZAPU-ZANU lines 
(M. Sithole 1990, 457). 
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Ethnicity and politics during the conflict and beyond 
ZANU and ZAPU guerrillas fighting the war “in the bush” were aided by the 
geographic pattern of white settlement in Rhodesia–sparsely populated farm areas were 
susceptible to guerrilla tactics–and by the sanctuary provided by neighboring Mozambique 
and Zambia. By 1972, the liberation movements intensified the conflict in the countryside 
through attacks on white farms and destruction of infrastructure and schools (Stedman 1993, 
129). Despite a ban on the movement’s existence in 1963, ZANU guerrillas spreading from 
the northeast of the country after 1972 organizationally established the ZANU half of the 
Patriotic Front. The grassroots approach of the soldiers of ZANLA–the armed sect of 
ZANU–had long-term implications for the movement’s future incarnation as a political 
party. After 1963 operating from a safe haven in Mozambique, Rhodesia’s eastern neighbor, 
ZANU carried out mobilization efforts in large areas of the Rhodesian countryside to 
demonstrate that it articulated the grievances of the black majority. 
Figure 1. The Ethnic Composition of Zimbabwe’s Population. 
 
Ethnicity plays an important role in explaining the ZANU-ZAPU divisions that were 
ignited during the liberation war and later molded national and local-level politics. The black 
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population in Zimbabwe belongs to about forty different ethnic groups (Sithole 1990, 455). 
At the time of British occupation in 1890, a long-standing dispute over land ownership 
prevailed between the Ndebele minority ethnic group–comprising about 19 percent of the 
black population–and the Shona majority, which account for about 77 percent of blacks. 
Each of these groups can be further divided into several sub-ethnic groups (see Figure 1). 
The overarching ethnic rift remained but was overshadowed during the “period of colonial 
consolidation and black acquiescence to white rule” (Sithole 1990). Liberation movement 
leaders were conscious of the Ndebele-Shona divide since the formation of the nationwide 
struggle for majority rule in the 1950s (1990, 460). By the 1970s ZAPU had become a 
Ndebele party and ZANU a Shona party, and both sects employed violence in attempts to 
eradicate the other. 
The unfolding of multiple-level conflict dynamics 
While ZANLA operated from Mozambique and in the eastern and southeastern 
regions of Zimbabwe, mobilizing the masses and waging guerrilla war on white settlers, 
ZIPRA guerrillas did not adopt the same two-pronged strategy. Its efforts focused 
significantly less on politicization and more on building relations with communities for 
immediate purposes: food, medical care and recruitment. ZIPRA also generally did not 
employ tactics of guerrilla warfare. The instructions of the guerrilla army’s high command 
for ZIPRA soldiers focused primarily on attacking white settlements and checking the 
westward advance of ZANLA forces (Cliffe et al 1980, 56). In addition to the ZAPU-ZANU 
split in 1963, the differing approaches to the conduct of the war by the two movements–and 
the mission of each to destroy the other–had clear implications for the rebels’ calculations 
about continuing the conflict or seeking a negotiated settlement. Given the Rhodesian 
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government’s militarily inferior position as the 1970s progressed and the war continued to 
rage, Mugabe and Nkomo, the leaders of ZANU and ZAPU respectively, each cultivated his 
own ideas about who would hold the reins of power when the black majority took power–
whether through military victory or a negotiated solution. 
By 1972, ZANLA’s strategy toward intensified, hit-and-run terrorist attacks and the 
Rhodesian government’s lack of preparation to combat the security threat posed to white 
settlers severely damaged the country. Stedman argues that two factors contributed to 
change the military situation in favor of the guerrillas: first, the collapse of the Portuguese 
colonial authorities in Mozambique in 1974-75, which opened a 600 mile-long safe haven for 
Zimbabwean guerrillas; and second, the counterterrorism approach of the Rhodesian 
security forces, which led tens of thousands of rural Zimbabweans into Mozambique as 
refugees, providing the liberation movement with thousands of young guerrilla recruits. (See 
Figure 2). Guerrilla offensives ravaged the Rhodesian economy, highly dependent on 
agriculture and reeling from international sanctions imposed in 1965 and 1968. In addition, 
the Rhodesian Armed Forces were able to draw only approximately 60,000-70,000 white 
men who were eligible for recruitment to the military (Stedman 1993, 130). The combination 
of these factors–and an internal fissure in the Smith government over the nature of the 
guerrilla threat–generated a distinctive military advantage for the guerrillas from the end of 







Figure 2. Infiltration routes of ZANLA and ZIPRA into Rhodesia 
 
Source: Hoffman, Bruce and David Arnold and Jennifer M. Taw. 1991. Lessons for Contemporary 
     Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 
 
Resistance, Ripeness and Rebel Calculations 
The developing contours of the military struggle gradually engendered revisions of 
the rebels’ and régime’s notions of their resolve to continue the fighting. Mugabe and 
Nkomo had been released from exile in 1974, and in 1976 the two groups had formed the 
Patriotic Front to present a unified face of the liberation movement in the context of 
negotiations. Two years later, Smith entered into an “internal settlement” with three 
moderate, non-militant nationalist leaders: Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and 
Chief Jeremiah Chirau, forming a new government. Smith conceded majority rule to blacks 
but retained veto power and a disproportionate number of national legislative seats for 
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whites. In brokering this agreement, Smith was attempting to negotiate with the “moderate 
fringe of the rebellion” (Zartman 1995, 23) and evade the settlement of fundamental 
incompatibilities with Mugabe and Nkomo. Instead, the war intensified; and the government 
held an election in April 1979–in which Muzorewa won a landslide victory for Prime 
Minister. 
Every internal conflict reaches a critical moment in which the opportunity to 
negotiate must be seized (Zartman 1985; 1995). “Ripe moments,” as defined by Zartman, 
“are composed of a structural element, a party element, and a potential alternative outcome–
that is, a mutually hurting stalemate, the presence of valid spokespersons, and a formula for 
a way out” (Zartman 1995, 18). The characteristic asymmetry of civil war makes stalemate–
not only on the battlefield but in terms of legitimacy and resources–difficult to attain. In 
1979, given the rebels’ distinct military advantage, the belligerents began to view negotiations 
as a means to achieving their maximum political gains–ideas which were gradually shifting as 
the war progressed. “In a situation of continuing uncertainties, parties negotiate when they 
change their estimates of future potentialities” (Zartman 1995, 18). The internal settlement 
generated political conditions that weakened Smith’s position amid a losing war, ultimately 
making a move toward negotiations more plausible for the rebel leaders, who were 
positioned to gain strategic political and military advantage. 
Prelude to Lancaster House–Attempts at International Mediation 1974-1979 
The move toward the negotiation table and ultimately a transition to political struggle 
unfolded over a series of three internationally-led attempts between 1974 and 1979 to 
mediate a settlement in Rhodesia before the Lancaster House conference. The attempt in 
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1974-75 of South African President John Vorster and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda 
to push through a plan to mediate peace talks between Smith and a unified coalition of all 
black nationalist leaders failed. The Kaunda-Vorster plan envisioned the Presidents of the 
Front Line states–the black countries bordering Rhodesia supporting the nationalists–
pressuring the black leaders into unification; South Africa would coerce the Smith 
government into accepting black majority rule. 
Having won a commitment to majority rule from Smith in 1976, U.S. Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger attempted to broker peace at a conference in Geneva. After three 
months of no progress, Kissinger lacked the key support of the Front Line Presidents and 
black nationalist leaders–who had not agreed to the conditions that Kissinger had promised 
Smith. His effort relied on “the crude invention of a ripe moment” (Stedman 1991, 118). 
Each side of the conflict still believed military victory was possible, and it became clear that 
Smith was not genuinely willing to relinquish white control of government. Moreover, the 
nationalist leadership was not sufficiently consolidated by 1976 to order a complete stop to 
the fighting, and the leaders themselves–including Sithole and Muzorewa–were divided. 
Finally, the Anglo-American efforts to engender a settlement to the conflict in 1977 
and 1978, led by David Owen and Cyrus Vance, were unsuccessful for two reasons: the 
insistence that the nationalist guerrillas comprise the national military during the transition 
period, to which the white government would not agree; and the concurrent, separate 
negotiation of Smith’s internal settlement (Stedman 1993, 133-4). 
A mutually hurting stalemate did not evolve clearly in the conflict in Rhodesia. Smith 
refused at all costs to consider a settlement to the war and yield to PF rule. ZANU and 
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ZAPU were internally divided: Mugabe’s strategy was to defeat the régime militarily, an 
outcome he saw as imminent; Nkomo believed that the PF would win the war but at a 
prohibitive cost. Both were aware of war weariness on the part of their regional supporters 
and their patrons’ preferences for a negotiated settlement given the heavy costs they were 
bearing (Stedman 1991, 137). 
Amid forceful external efforts, a ripe moment for international mediation emerged. 
The belligerents had reached deadlock: they could not escalate the conflict with the available 
means and at an acceptable cost. Asymmetry on the battlefield favored the rebels, and the 
British as self-appointed mediators took advantage of an opening permitted by Rhodesian 
domestic politics. The April 1979 election of Muzorewa as Prime Minister facilitated the 
participation in negotiations of a decision-maker other than Smith, changing the power 
calculus of the parties to the talks–particularly of the British, who saw Muzorewa as weak. 
The Rhodesian government entered into negotiations at Lancaster House because they were 
lured by the British offer of possible recognition of the government and as a result, the 
lifting of international sanctions. Muzorewa also believed that he could win a post-settlement 
election against Mugabe (Stedman 1991, 237). 
The PF was willing to moderate when the Mozambican and Zambian governments 
pressed Mugabe and Nkomo through threatened withdraw of military support and resources 
that were imperative to the continuation of the conflict. Mozambican President and former 
revolutionary leader Samora Machel believed that Mugabe would win any election (Stedman 
1991, 237). The rebels’ decision to come to the table at Lancaster House depended heavily 
on Mugabe’s and Nkomo’s calculations of their post-settlement political prospects. Smith’s 
rigid adherence to continued military struggle amid likely defeat shaped Mugabe’s tactical 
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strategy throughout the latter 1970s regarding the choice of armed conflict or future electoral 
struggle. 
Mugabe was convinced that he could win outright and he feared risking the gains 
he had already won. Mugabe was convinced that he would win an election, but 
was unsure he would have a chance to win an election. He believed in armed 
struggle, because of Smith. (British diplomat 1987, quoted in Stedman 1993, 138) 
 
Despite a belief that the rebels were headed for military victory and the risk of negotiations, 
Mugabe led the PF into the next round of negotiations because the PF would lose the 
support of its regional patrons if it continued fighting. Mugabe foresaw that an end to the 
war would allow the rebels to assume political power through means deemed free and fair by 
international standards. Like the course of the conflict itself, the Rhodesian people and the 
anticipated trajectory of negotiations favored the rebels. Stedman’s concept of “refined 
ripeness” emphasizes that not all parties must perceive a mutually hurting stalemate for a 
ripe moment for mediation to emerge. With concrete pressure from Machel in particular on 
Mugabe–who did not see a peace process as necessary–to end the fighting, and the 
individual convictions of Mugabe, Nkomo and Muzorewa that each would win at the ballot 
box permitted a “paradoxical situation in which both sides believe that a settlement will 
produce a victory for them” (Stedman 1991, 237).     
 
Lancaster House, 1979–An Internationally-steered Peace Process and Settlement 
How did the incentives and opportunities of the Lancaster House agreement develop 
during the negotiations in a way that the rebels and the régime were willing to agree on its 
provisions? The British approach to the arbitration of peace talks was openly heavy-handed. 
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British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington made it clear that British proposals–not 
suggestions or statements from other parties–would form the working basis for discussion 
and compromise throughout the talks (Stedman 1993, 141). In the end, the British steering 
of the process permitted the emergence of a settlement that would shape the rules of the 
game in Zimbabwean politics for decades. 
To the rebels, the outcome of the negotiation over the critical transitional period 
would determine its success in the post-settlement election. Before Lancaster House talks 
began, the PF’s maximum position of taking power without negotiations or previous 
elections meant it was willing to discuss the specifics of a new constitution and schedule 
elections after assuming power: from their perspective, “rules and organic structures could 
always be changed afterwards” (Low 1985, 102). The PF recognized, however, that it was 
not sufficiently confident of winning power militarily that it could adopt too inflexible a 
position going into negotiations. The significant geographical presence of ZANU and ZAPU 
and their leaders’ fear of losing the local control and political ground they had won on the 
battlefield, as well as the leverage of the gun, impacted their preferences during the talks. The 
PF insisted unsuccessfully on negotiating the elements of the transition first. 
As the British mediator with “dictatorial power” (Stedman 1993, 141), Carrington 
insisted that the constitution be the initial and fundamental focus of the negotiations before 
considerations of security and the transition period in order to ensure that the talks first 
addressed the incompatibility at the crux of the conflict–the structure of government. In 
Carrington’s words, “…the only way to end the war is to remove the reasons for it” 
(Stedman 1993, 141). 
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Conversely, constitutional guarantees and the structure of the independent 
government were more important to Smith and the Rhodesian government. Their objective 
was to secure for the white population solid constitutional protections, which eventually 
emerged in the form of a pre-determined number of parliamentary seats reserved for whites. 
The final arrangement required the Smith government to yield more than “the trappings of 
power” (Low 1985, 105). At Lancaster House Smith was forced to negotiate with his 
enemies and make enormous concessions.  
The outcome of Lancaster House negotiations 
As the two fundamental sources of conflict, majority rule and land distribution had 
to be addressed in any peace process. 102 days of negotiations resulted in a final agreement 
on a new constitution, transitional arrangements and a ceasefire. Among the most important 
provisions of the final, agreed-upon constitution were: majority rule; parliamentary 
democracy based on party-list proportional representation; twenty seats reserved for whites 
in the 100-seat lower house of the legislature; a comprehensive Bill of Rights with guarantees 
for individual freedoms; and compensation provided to white settlers for land redistribution. 
The constitution also provided for a seven-year guarantee of the overrepresentation of 
whites in parliament and a ten-year assurance of multi-party governance (Sithole 1997, 128). 
Disputes over the question of land reform threatened the conference and required the PF to 
submit to the stipulation that it reimburse settlers for the “recovery of the land of which the 




The transitional arrangements provided for a British governor who would administer 
an interim government through existing Rhodesian government infrastructure during a 
twelve-week transition period in which multi-party elections would be organized. 
Commonwealth observers would monitor the elections. Muzorewa agreed to resign and 
allow the British to govern during the transition. The PF ultimately gained for their militaries 
symbolic recognition equal to that of the Rhodesian security forces (Stedman 1993, 153), but 
did not secure the formation of an integrated transitional security force. The ceasefire, 
settled a month after the transitional period was finalized, would largely be self-enforced by 
the armies themselves, without a peacekeeping force. Rhodesian troops would deploy to 
their barracks, and the PF guerrillas inside Rhodesia would report to assembly points where 
they would be fed and monitored by a 1,200-member Commonwealth Monitoring Force. 
 
International Influence on the Rebels and Implications for Their Entry into Politics 
International actors, particularly Great Britain, significantly molded the process and 
outcome of negotiations at Lancaster House. The settlement that resulted was a clear 
demonstration of both the British colonial hold and its ardent desperation to extricate itself 
from continued authority in Rhodesia. In the end, the internal parties demonstrated a 
willingness to accept conditions and compromises that were externally imposed because 
doing so permitted two important results–legitimization of the peace process and its 
outcome; and an end to the war. The settlement importantly redefined politics and power in 
what became Zimbabwe following the initial election. Compromise on the terms of access to 
violence and politics characterized the outcome of Lancaster House–results engineered by 
the British mediators. 
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International and regional players’ influence on the rebel leaders 
The most significant international imprint on the peace process in Zimbabwe and on 
the rebels’ approval of the agreement that paved the way for their entry into politics was 
unquestionably British mediation. Carrington’s ability to shape the motivations of various 
actors through thorough preparation, careful sequencing and the creation of “consistent 
networks of linked agreements” (Lax and Sebenius 1986, quoted in Stedman 1991, 23) 
permitted the mediation effort to succeed. Britain’s achievement at Lancaster House 
removed the “diplomatic thorn” (Preston 2004, 153) of Rhodesia that had jeopardized 
relations with its former colonies and undermined its position in the United Nations and the 
Commonwealth. 
The regional governments that funded and sheltered the guerrilla movements greatly 
impacted the decisions of ZANU and ZAPU to end the conflict and enter political struggle. 
The Front Line states, particularly Zambia and Mozambique, lent direct support to the 
nationalist movements. Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda was consistently supportive of 
negotiation efforts and maintained a less militarist stance toward the Rhodesian conflict than 
Machel–who had fought a nationalist guerrilla war in his own country and believed socialist 
principles were central to the liberation of southern Africa as a whole. As a result, his 
government’s support for ZANLA and Mugabe took a different form than Zambia’s 
support for ZIPRA. Machel’s FRELIMO supplied bases for ZANU in Mozambique; at least 
five hundred troops for combat alongside ZANLA; and the closure of its Rhodesian border. 
Kaunda also sealed Zambia’s border until it became economically untenable (Preston 2004, 
161). In 1979, the toll on both the Zambian and Mozambican economies had reached 
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destructive levels. It was in the interests of the Front Line states to end the violence and 
repair the destruction in their countries. 
Without the Front Line states’ active assistance, the guerrillas could not continue the 
war. The fervent pressure of the Front Line Presidents was clear to Mugabe: 
The front-line states said we had to negotiate we had to agree to go to this 
conference. There we were, we thought we were on top of the situation back 
home, we were moving forward all the time, and why should we be denied the 
ultimate joy of having militarily overthrown the regime…?... But this other way, 
no. We had to meet with Muzorewa and Smith as equals (Charlton 1990, 69-70; 
italics in original). 
 
Throughout various mediation efforts, the role of the Front Line Presidents–
including also Julius Nyerere of Tanzania–was to provide the necessary pressure to compel 
the PF leaders to agree to British demands. Dexterous engineering by the British arbitrators 
resulted in a negotiation process and outcome that relied on the Front Line Presidents as 
reliable agents of leverage and trusted allies of the rebel leaders with a vested interest in their 
success. 
The United States exerted notable influence on the rebels and the régime at various 
moments throughout the conflict and peace process. The role of the United States as a 
mediator in partnership with the British was critical to applying pressure on combatants in 
early efforts. Through Kissinger’s ultimately failed intervention and the 1975-76 Anglo-
American initiative, U.S. negotiators conveyed a message that the resolution of the Rhodesia 
conflict was of interest to the international community outside of the decolonization impetus 
of the British. Checking the expansion of the Soviet Union in southern Africa was 
Kissinger’s primary objective when he became personally involved in negotiation efforts. 
Through his interactions with Kissinger, Smith learned to use U.S. influence with the Front 
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Line states and nationalist leaders to obtain an acceptable settlement (Low 1985, 105). Smith 
continually turned to and relied on the support of outside actors to achieve agreement from 
the nationalist groups. 
Early in the Lancaster House talks, the United States expressed ambiguous 
willingness to support a fund to help an independent Zimbabwe finance compensation to 
white settlers whose land would be redistributed under a new government (Stedman 1993, 
146). This provided the face-saving guarantee that the PF needed to be able to accept the 
constitutional provisions, primarily the reimbursement obligation–a major concession on the 
rebels’ part since land was the conflict issue around which many nationalist supporters and 
would-be voters had mobilized. 
The Soviet Union was less involved in supporting revolutionaries in Rhodesia than in 
other civil conflicts during the Cold War. The USSR provided training and arms to guerrilla 
forces in southern Africa but considered Rhodesia and Namibia to be part of the U.S. sphere 
of influence (Preston 2004, 158). The Soviets primarily supported ZAPU and ZIPRA to the 
exclusion of ZANU, who sought assistance from China, as well as Yugoslavia and Romania. 
The Chinese made small arms transfers to ZANLA and provided economic and diplomatic 
aid to bolster the African nationalist cause. China’s reconsideration of its revolutionary 
assistance policies beginning in 1975 led to an eventual withdraw of weapons supplies and 
other aid to ZANU. Preston argues that this change had little impact on Mugabe’s 
calculations about the end of the conflict or peace talks. Finally, the Cuban régime provided 
direct military assistance to the PF and Front Line states; when in June 1979 a Cuban 
proposal called for the surrender of the guerrillas’ political independence in a rebel-
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controlled area of Rhodesia, Mugabe and Nkomo rejected it (159). In sum, the world’s 
communist powers had little influence on the rebels’ movement toward politics. 
Another regional player, South Africa, supported the Rhodesian government against 
the nationalist guerrillas. South African investment in the war was estimated at $300 million 
by 1975, in the form of arms, funds, weapons and fuel (Preston 2004, 165). The Smith 
government’s relations were often tense with South Africa, whose interests were regional 
stability, the prevention of a radical Marxist regime from taking power in Rhodesia and 
maintaining apartheid at home. The South Africans, who continually exerted pressure on 
Smith to forge a settlement, had their own reasons for wanting an end to the war in 
Rhodesia (Low 1985, 104). Dzimba describes South African policy in the region beginning in 
1977 as “destabilization,” aimed at countering what they perceived as “the Moscow-led 
communist conspiracy through regional governments, initially Angola and Mozambique and 
later Zimbabwe” (Dzimba 1998, 1). The collapse of Portuguese rule in particular shaped 
South Africa’s concerted strategy to ensure that Rhodesia did not fall to the rebels but 
became responsive to South Africa’s demands and interests in the region (41). 
British Mediation and Rebel Accession to Politics 
The role of the British as “arbitrator” (Stedman 1991) ensured that a settlement 
emerged from Lancaster House. Lord Carrington’s function in the negotiation process might 
be compared to Zartman’s social decision-making mode of “judication” (Zartman 1977, 621-
22). Carrington can be conceived as an individual actor in a collective process in which the 
“social units” are the warring parties. As the primary arbitrator, Carrington himself had 
assumed a degree of adjudicatory authority which ensured that his proposals set the tone and 
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exclusively provided the substance of the negotiations. He controlled and defined the 
parties’ communications with one another through ongoing bilateral meetings. The British 
approach influenced the belligerents, engendering a perfunctory negotiating environment. As 
a result of this mediation style, a limited range of genuine engagement between the white 
government and black guerrilla leaders or even between the PF and the black political 
leaders emerged at the negotiating table. 
The British had determined before the conference began that they would secure a 
final settlement to which all the parties would agree. The process of the peace talks 
demonstrated that external actors were more interested in securing a settlement than the 
substance of the agreement. The belligerents realized they were aided by the mission of the 
British to extricate themselves from governance in Rhodesia and took advantage of these 
circumstances. In a national environment in which zero-sum politics defined interaction, this 
focus on an outcome may have aided the persistence of characteristic all-or-nothing politics 
of Zimbabwe in the post-conflict period. 
The Lancaster House experience suggests that involvement of regional actors who 
can represent and co-opt the rebels is essential to getting them to the table and to accept 
certain provisions. The British relied on forging good relations with the Front Line 
Presidents in the interest of leveraging their influence with Mugabe and Nkomo. Third-party 
mediators must find ways to develop working relationships with all parties in a peace process 
because the approval, influence and leverage that secondary players provide may be crucial 
to coercing the rebels or the régime into accepting a final settlement. 
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Mugabe recognized that exploiting the opportunities presented by the British at 
Lancaster House would provide international legitimization of the peace process and allow 
him to compete in an election in which he was confident of victory. Accepting an 
agreement–even if less than ideal in terms of the goals of the liberation movement–black 
majority rule and land reclamation–would allow him to seize a powerful mandate to govern 
an independent Zimbabwe. Once Mugabe accepted that military victory would not be 
possible, he took advantage of the British urgency to secure an agreement. The international 
community provided “a way out” of conflict for the liberation movements, making their 
accession to democratic politics possible in a racially-charged environment that had never 
before permitted the political coexistence and competition of black and white rivals on equal 
ground. 
Former U.S. assistant secretary of state Chester Crocker argues that the external 
dimension of civil war must be resolved and removed before the combatants can resolve the 
core internal conflict (Zartman 1995, 5). In the case of Zimbabwe, one might argue that the 
heavy-handed participation of the colonial power in a four-year peace process was essential 
to a settlement. The impetus for decolonization and a resolution of the “Rhodesia problem” 
fueled the urgency of the Lancaster House peace effort. Still, the external dimension could 
not be sufficiently uprooted to the extent that the conflict was whittled down to the 
incompatibility among internal parties. The fundamental rift was driven by the legacy of 
colonialism, which had permitted racial and political inequalities in Rhodesia to persist. The 
perfunctory settlement brought an end to the civil conflict and instituted a political system 




Liberation turned Democracy–Popular Support for the Rebels 
The Zimbabwean guerrilla coalition operated with a clear mandate during the 
conflict, and after its negotiated settlement, the politicized mission of African liberation 
translated into electoral support. Led by ZANU and ZAPU, blacks–those who remained 
within Rhodesia’s borders and the refugees in Mozambique and Zambia–perceived 
themselves as being liberated and as claiming political control of their nation for the first 
time. In this sense, the guerrillas were able to exploit a common, collective identity with 
blacks who had been oppressed by whites for decades. In addition to race, ethnicity was a 
critical factor in determining which sect of the nationalist movement blacks supported in 
particular areas controlled by ZANLA and ZIPRA. 
The mobilization strategies undertaken by ZANU and ZAPU during the war helped 
determine the electoral backing that each political party received in the initial post-conflict 
election. Multiple, interactive modes of popular support formed the basis of the nationalists’ 
reliance on the electorate. By the time of the February 1980 vote, Mugabe had split the 
coalition, having decided that ZANU would run alone. While ZANU focused its efforts on 
community mobilization, during the war ZAPU did not politicize the population with a view 
to the long-term advantages this might provide the movement (Cliffe et al 1980 55). This 
difference had implications for electoral performance, but perhaps more important was the 






A Fragile Guerrilla Coalition: Political Constituencies and Mobilization Strategies 
The guerrillas received popular support by promising particular collective goods to 
the communities in which they lived and from which they based their military operations. 
The nationalist movements made promises to the poor blacks in the Tribal Trust Lands–
scattered, discrete pockets of poor-quality land reserved for Africans. These incentives 
included land ownership; loans to farmers; a minimum wage for agricultural laborers on 
settler farms; and an examination of the salary structures of mine and industrial workers 
(Cliffe et al 1980, 48). The supporters cultivated by the guerrillas through promises of land 
reclamation comprised the nationalists’ definitive primary constituency. Backing on the basis 
of land was critical to their sustained popularity, founding purpose and the electoral support 
on which Mugabe and Nkomo depended at Lancaster House and in the transition period 
following the end of the war. 
The two nationalist rebel groups–operating in differing territories, employing 
different military tactics and often engaged in combat with one another–cultivated the 
support of their primary constituency–landless, rural blacks, in divergent ways. In rural areas 
of northeastern and eastern Rhodesia and in the bordering provinces of Mozambique from 
where they launched attacks and maintained bases, ZANU and its ZANLA guerrillas treated 
the liberation war as a political campaign. Lionel Cliffe and his co-authors argue that the 
guerrilla presence spreading from the northeast of the country after 1972 established the 
party and guaranteed its electoral victory. The ZANLA guerrillas set up levels of 
organization among the communities in which they hid; they built organizational structures 
in fragmented areas dispersed among white settler farms–“a patchwork of semi-liberated 
pockets in a majority of the TTLs” (Cliffe et al 1980, 49). 
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ZANLA guerrillas helped develop a hierarchical system, forming committees at the 
provincial to village levels, and in areas where the Rhodesian state apparatus was ineffective, 
the committee structure constituted a parallel governing structure and provided basic social 
services. The teenage mujibas allied to ZANLA in the communities served as community 
watchdogs, gatekeepers and liaisons between the people and the guerrillas. The mujiba 
networks, people’s committees and the guerrillas formed the complex structural network on 
which ZANU could rely in the countryside (Cliffe et al 1980, 54). 
Based in the west and northwest of Rhodesia and in Zambia, ZAPU operatives relied 
on the pre-war popular mobilization it carried out in the early 1960s when it operated legally, 
and on the underground structures that developed following the ban on the party. ZAPU 
did not emphasize wartime political mobilization; its leaders focused on military attacks, 
establishing public relations mainly for obtaining minimal basic supplies and needs for 
guerrilla soldiers. The failure to make popular politicization a definitive goal contributed to a 
crisis of purpose within ZAPU in 1970, which affected its leadership cohesion and resulted 
in an even greater emphasis on military over political operations (Cliffe et al 1980, 55-56). By 
that time ZIPRA forces were deployed mainly to hold their ground in the western regions of 
Rhodesia and check the advance of ZANLA forces. Their local-level backing relied not on 
political mobilization but the popular confidence they gained as a result of military victories. 
Guerrilla combatants were a fundamentally important constituency of the nationalist 
movement as a whole. The guerrillas’ relationships with their respective parties and their 
leadership were based simultaneously on cooperation and conflict (Kriger 2003, 24-29). In 
securing territory and the “liberation” of delimited areas of the Rhodesian state, the guerrillas 
at varying times employed coercion and violence against innocent civilians. Their lack of 
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discipline is attributed by various analysts to the guerrillas’ resentment of neglect by their 
leadership; a lack of ideological training and overall guiding purpose; and guerrillas’ 
frustration over not being able to secure a particular liberated zone or reliable popular 
support (27). 
Guerrillas’ use of violence to influence levels of popular backing foreshadowed the 
violent voter coercion that took place in February 1980 at polling stations and in 
communities by ZANLA guerrillas who had been instructed by Mugabe and ZANU leaders 
not to report to assigned assembly places but to remain in their operational areas, in 
violation of the ceasefire (Kriger 2005, 4). The report of the British Observer Group (BOG) 
on the election proceedings documented “brutal ‘disciplining murders’ as examples” and 
“generalized threats of retribution or a continuance or resumption of the war” if ZANU 
(PF) did not win the election (BOG 1980, 13). Mugabe’s decision to violate the ceasefire and 
intimidate essentially first-time voters betrays, at best, a fundamental misunderstanding of 
democratic politics, or worse, a purposeful circumvention of its basic elements following a 
war for majority political power. 
Rebel leaders’ predictions of their own parties’ success also depend on the electoral 
and other types of support they expect to receive from guerrillas in the post-conflict context. 
The number of militants a rebel movement claims, then, is expected to be an important 
factor in determining its success as a political party (Allison 2006, 152-3). In addition to the 
degree to which guerrillas mobilize the population, the number of guerrillas–as committed 
and mobilized political actors–will influence the decision of rebels to disarm and enter 
politics. Reliable data on the numbers of guerrillas are difficult to find, but one estimate puts 
the total number of combined guerrilla forces in 1980 at 65,000 (Kriger 2003, 24). 
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The Zimbabwean guerrillas–particularly ZANLA fighters who received privileged 
status as a result of ZANU having won the election and thus control of institutions–became 
elites in the post-war political landscape. Kriger argues that war veterans and the ZANU 
régime used and abused one another for power, and these interactions shaped the political 
environment, popular perceptions and electoral outcomes (2003). After the war, guerrilla ex-
combatants continued to carry out and enforce ZANU’s mission. 
The guerrillas’ use of violence during and after the war exploited the profound 
cleavages in Zimbabwean society that were deepened by the conflict. As the war intensified 
during the 1970s, political divisions between ZANU and ZAPU catalyzed and revealed 
ethnic fissures in the black population, eventually resulting in the conflict in the 
Matabeleland provinces that began in the early 1980s. Tribal divisions are rooted deeply in 
history, and the conflict made ethnic differences starker and more divisive, linking them 
directly with politics and violence. ZANU, led by Mugabe (a Shona) came to be identified 
with the Shona-speaking peoples and ZAPU’s Nkomo (a Ndebele) implicated the party’s 
association with the Ndebele tribe. The 1980 election results illustrated clear support for 
ZANU in the eastern provinces and ZAPU’s base of popular backing in the two 
Matabeleland provinces; in the immediate aftermath of a nationalist war for black liberation, 
votes were cast along basically ethnic lines. 
Emphasis on racial and ethnic dimensions results in an oversimplification of the 
conflict in Rhodesia and the fact that it was a violent struggle between African nationalists as 
well as of rebels against a régime. Cliffe et al argue that the tendency to identify one party 
with a particular tribe or language group occurred throughout the factional infighting that 
occurred among leaders of the nationalist movement, its splits, periods in exile and through 
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the actual geographic pattern of the combat. The territorial dimension of Zimbabwean 
electoral trends coincides with ethnic and racial splits, evidenced by ZANU’s refusal to allow 
other parties to enter ZANLA-controlled areas during the 1980 election campaign. 
As “political entrepreneurs,” rebel leaders and régimes draw on and exploit ethnicity 
for political gain, altering the outlook for conflict resolution and democratic modes of 
struggle. Civil conflict heightens people’s sense of fear and instability; as a result, they rely 
more on preexisting ties like ethnicity and religion (Tarrow 1998, 145). As the case of the PF 
illustrates, rebel organizations make appeals to this hyper-articulated group identity and even 
construct new identities through violent struggle (Lyons 2005, 43). When Stedman asked 
Nkomo about the conflict between the Shona and Ndebele in Zimbabwe, he responded, 
“There is no conflict between the peoples of Zimbabwe. It is something that we leaders 
create” (Stedman 1991, 31-32, cf. 2). A quote from a ZIPRA guerrilla in December 1980 
conveys a similar notion: “Hatred is being brought about by our own leaders; it is going to 
bring hatred between the people of Zimbabwe. People are being kept apart by the leaders” 
(Cliffe et al 1980, 66). 
The brutal massacres later carried out by ZANU(PF)’s North Korean-trained Fifth 
Brigade security force in the Matabaleland provinces of Zimbabwe from 1982-1987 
demonstrated that not only would violence be employed on large-scale levels to guarantee 
political outcomes, but that ethnicity would be exploited as a mobilizing element of national 
politics. 
Differences between the guerrilla sects and their supporters can be explained by the 
politicization of ethnicity, the growing rift between the leaders of ZANU and ZAPU, and 
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their divergent strategies during the conflict. As became increasingly clear as the war 
progressed, particularly in the late 1970s, the electoral struggle in the post-war era would 
include competition between the two movements. Mugabe’s ambitions of authoritative 
political power molded his views of his role in an independent Zimbabwe and thus his 
decision to enter talks as part of a unified nationalist alliance with a clear military advantage 
over government forces. Even as late as 1978, Mugabe had not fully consolidated his 
leadership of ZANU and was cautious about taking steps that would disturb intra-rebel 
politics. Mugabe viewed the alliance with ZAPU as key to maintaining a unified front for the 
purposes of peace talks and for regional and international legitimacy, but he had no plans to 
share government. The conflict itself–popular mobilization by the guerrillas and military 
advances against the régime–shaped Mugabe’s increasingly ambitious goals. 
Carrots and Sticks in a Battle for Legitimacy 
The amount and nature of political support the movement anticipates it will 
engender as a legal political party in a post-conflict electoral contest will largely determine its 
willingness to negotiate war termination and abandon violence as a means for pursuing its 
ends. Weinstein argues that identity-based groups are more likely to be successfully 
incorporated into the design of political institutions than rebel groups that are dependent on 
material incentives or on the provision of tangible goods to its supporters or soldiers (2002, 
4). The liberation movements in Zimbabwe benefited from exploiting the ethnic and racial 
ties of the black majority and promises of the right to representation in a white, colonially-
dominated society, as well as from their pledges of post-war prestige and enrichment to 
guerrillas (Kriger 2003). Civilian supporters–whose support was changeable over time and at 
time shifted between ZANU and ZAPU depending on ethnicity, location and an area’s pre-
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war history–counted not only on promises of land but often benefited from the guerillas’ 
development of alternative governance structures and social service provision. 
In addition to collective material incentives, Zimbabwean guerrillas employed 
violence to ensure popular support. Lyons points to “the legacy of fear” that infiltrates the 
minds of voters as they prepare to participate in a form of political struggle that has been 
unfamiliar to them prior to and throughout internal conflict. “Voters in postconflict 
elections often choose to use the limited power of their franchise either to appease the most 
powerful faction in the hope of preventing a return to war or to select the most nationalistic 
and chauvinistic candidate who credibly pledges to protect the voter’s community” (2005, 
61). Intimidation played a role in shaping civilians’ political backing of the rebels and thus 
the confidence of the rebels as they entered peace talks. 
The fact that each nationalist leader believed he could win an independence election 
accounts in large part for the success of the British in producing an agreement at Lancaster 
House. Mugabe, Nkomo and Muzorewa each believed that he had sufficient popular support 
to win. Rebel leaders’ perceptions of their own popular support were a critical component of 
their decisions to abandon the conflict. The mediators intentionally cultivated a sense of 
plausible victory for all warring parties, employing the legitimization provided by an election 
to induce cooperation. 
Not only is war politics by other means in Zimbabwe, as in Clausewitz’s formulation; 
war is a part of politics in Zimbabwe. The nationalist movement remained divided on ZAPU 
and ZANU lines during the liberation struggle and afterwards. Some white Rhodesians’ 
predictions of tribal-based conflict did not materialize in the aftermath of the initial post-
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settlement election. However, the divisions between ZAPU and ZANU sparked greater 
violence between ZANLA and ZIPRA former combatants as the rebels’ internal antagonism 
solidified following Mugabe’s decision to run without ZAPU in the 1980 election and 
ZANLA’s resultant elevated status. ZIPRA’s active animosity toward ZANLA and ZANU 
targets increased, and the result was a bloodbath in Matabeleland. 
 
Negotiating Democratization: Impact of Electoral System Type on Rebels’ Decision 
 to Enter Politics 
The decision of the nationalist rebels ultimately to accept the agreement was directly 
linked to the guarantees and incentives negotiated at Lancaster House. Among these 
assurances were the intricacies of the political system that would take root in Zimbabwe’s 
nascent independent period and lay the groundwork for the initial election in February 1980. 
Generally, the political system that all parties understood to be at stake even before the talks 
began was Western-style electoral democracy. The PF’s acceptance of the electoral system as 
it was packaged at Lancaster House meant providing whites with an inflated level of 
guaranteed representation in parliament. Mugabe and the PF accepted this system even as 
they abandoned definitive aims of the liberation struggle, including equal rights to the land 
for blacks and full, genuine self-determination–majority rule without guarantees to the 
régime. It is not unreasonable to argue that Mugabe’s calculation about accepting the 
agreement and its electoral provisions entailed a strategy based on winning power and having 
a mandate to change the rules of the game later. Indeed its negotiating strategy often 
reflected this general approach to resolution of the conflict and the ensuing arrangement. 
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For Mugabe, embracing electoral democracy was a means of assuring and 
legitimizing his accession to power following the war. While the number of seats reserved 
for whites concerned Mugabe and the nationalist leaders, the particular system under 
discussion–as long as it allowed for “one man, one vote”–was not a major consideration for 
the rebels in coming to the table and entering politics. Electoral system institutions and the 
constitutional structure of government could have been more favorable to ZANU than what 
was employed. ZANU would have been better served by a non-PR and non-parliamentary 
system, given its strength as the largest party (Shugart 1992, 131 cf. 7). The ZANU 
government later replaced PR with a one-seat district plurality system and an elected 
presidency. As Shugart argues, international monitoring of the election provided guarantees 
to the rebels and reduced their costs of participation, but the system was not designed to 
help the rebels win a greater share of seats or executive power through institutional reforms.  
What mattered was allowing the rebels to benefit at the table from their distinct 
military advantage over the régime and compete in an election with the overwhelming 
support of a large majority of the population. Due to this imbalance, as Shugart suggests, 
guarantees were made to the Rhodesian government to lower the cost of its tolerating rebel 
participation in the system. These guarantees ensured an overrepresentation of the white 
minority in the assembly. ZANU received assurances in the form of an armed 
Commonwealth election monitoring force. The more than 22,000 ZANU/ZAPU rebels 
mostly complied with disarmament as a condition for the continuation of support from 
Britain, Mozambique and South Africa (Shugart 1992, 131-3). The rebel leaders’ original 
demands for power-sharing during the ceasefire and transition period were not fulfilled: the 
British insisted on a much shorter transition than the six months Mugabe requested, and 
56 
 
there was no transfer of any state power or control of security forces to ZANU/ZAPU 
before the elections. 
ZANU’s anticipated voter support was so strong that Mugabe decided that 
maintaining the joint rebel coalition was unnecessary to achieve sufficient political space to 
crowd out the régime. The PF tactical alliance served during the peace process as a means of 
presenting the rebels as an ascendant, united movement. Mugabe’s decision shortly before 
the election to run without ZAPU and Nkomo revealed both the extreme advantage of 
ZANU over ZAPU and the other electoral contenders and Mugabe’s ambition. Though the 
constitution guaranteed a multi-party system for ten years, ZANU(PF) party officials rallied 
supporters with calls for one-party rule within the first year of its 1980 election victory 
(Kriger 2005, 5). 
While providing disproportionate advantages to whites, the electoral system agreed 
upon at Lancaster House–while not an embodiment of liberation from colonial and white 
dominance as envisioned in the nationalist struggle–provided the political space that the 
guerrillas perceived would allow them to pursue those objectives with an electoral mandate. 
Mugabe gave up full land reclamation–the definitive grievance of the struggle for liberation 
and self-determination. Some analysts argue that liberty and constitutionalism were won at 
the negotiating table, but liberation was seen to be lost. 
 
Conclusions 
Violence continues to figure centrally in political contention in Zimbabwe. The 
divisive implications of a colonial legacy, a racially-defined struggle over access to resources, 
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and ethnic tensions among blacks became worsened as nationalist parties and the Rhodesian 
régime went to war. In the lead-up to the assumption of power by the African nationalists 
through elections and independence in 1980, all-or-nothing perceptions of the struggle for 
political power and control of government were manifest in a climate of intense intimidation 
and violence by security forces. 
Without a grounded history in the country, democratic elections were seen as a tool 
for marginalized sectors to seize the reins of power and ensure that it remained in their 
hands. The exigencies of international trends of decolonization, a regional revolutionary 
upward trajectory and the conflicted internal relationship between rebel leadership and the 
guerrillas were among the defining characteristics of the environment in which the Lancaster 
House agreement was shaped and emerged. Internal actors invested little in the process of 
negotiations that were focused wholly on the product and little on substance. Any analysis of 
the implications of Lancaster House must take into account the rebels’ use of violence and 
intimidation during the conflict and on election day. Guerrilla forces, instructed to remain in 
ZANU-controlled communities to maintain order at polling stations–in violation of the 
ceasefire and disarmament–were tasked with ensuring voters’ support of ZANU through 
fear-mongering and physical violence (Kriger 2005, 4-5). 
The outcome of the peace process was an agreement steered by external actors that 
seemed at once thrown together and wound tightly, with significant compromises and 
simultaneously, no genuine commitment by combatants. The rebels perceived international 
involvement as necessary to their assumption of legitimate authority and exploited the peace 
process as much as the mediators depended on their commitment to it. In the end, the rebels 
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calculated that preserving the authority they gained through guerrilla war and negotiations 































3 The FMLN and El Salvador’s Democratic Revolution 
On March 17, 2009, President-elect Mauricio Funes vowed to bring hope and 
change to El Salvador, revitalize the small Central American country’s economy and 
strengthen relations with the United States (Booth 2009, A09). In a contest with impressive 
sixty percent voter turnout, the election of Funes, a first-time politician and former television 
journalist represents the rise to power of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front 
(FMLN), the leftist party founded by guerrillas in 1994 following a peace accord and civil 
conflict that killed 75,000 people. Since then, the FMLN rebels-turned-politicians have 
constituted the main opposition party–without a presidential electoral victory to date–in a 
political system dominated since the 1980s by the conservative National Republican Alliance 
(ARENA) party. Legislative elections in January 2009 demonstrated a clear consolidation of 
political authority by the FMLN, which gained 35 seats over ARENA’s 32. In the eyes of the 
former guerrilla party, the democratic revolution initiated in the 1970s has come full circle. 
After over a decade of civil war, the rebels and the régime signed the Chapultepec 
Peace Accords in January 1992 in Mexico City, signaling a widening of political opportunities 
for all Salvadorans–a definitive element of the FMLN’s revolutionary platform during the 
war. What advantages did the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional perceive in 
negotiating an end to civil conflict and transition to electoral struggle? What was the military 
status of the conflict, and how did this shape their considerations? What institutional, 
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organizational and external factors and incentives shaped the anticipated benefits of armed 
struggle for the rebels? How did they perceive that politics would serve their revolutionary 
objectives? 
To begin to address these questions, an understanding of conflict background and 
dynamics, and the “ripe moment” (Zartman 1989) that led the belligerents to seek peace is 
presented in the first section of the chapter. The subsequent three sections will analyze the 
various impacts of international influence, civilian support and the electoral system on the 
FMLN’s entrance into the political system. The rebels’ decision to abandon armed struggle 
and enter politics rested on several interactive factors: the military status of the conflict, 
which by 1989 had reached a stalemate; the anticipated international legitimacy that the 
peace process would afford the FMLN; and the domestic electoral benefits the movement 
anticipated on the basis of the its efforts to achieve political revolution in the countryside. 
 
Conflict Context: Background and Dynamics of the Salvadoran Civil War (1980-1992) 
 The origins of civil war in El Salvador can be traced to the institutionalized alliance 
of the economic elite and the military–a relationship that has caused comparable inequality 
and instability in other Central American countries. As unequal conditions, poverty and 
unrest generated social movements in the 1970s, the Salvadoran state countered with 
repressive policies designed to eliminate all forms and faces of subversive, leftist behavior. 
The guerrilla movement provided expression for the emergent social and political forces of 
this period.  
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The majority of Salvadorans were excluded from “all but the most meager life 
opportunities” (Wood 2003, 11). The expansion of coffee production in the late nineteenth 
century displaced the country’s indigenous communities, as competition for their land and 
labor put them in conflict with commercial and government elites. The expropriation of 
landholders resulted in the control of the best agricultural land by two small groups–
plantation owners and coffee processors. Indigenous people were forced into bonded labor 
and landlessness. An indigenous uprising in 1932 was crushed by government forces, leaving 
17,000 dead and rural residents silenced, without political or other recourse from the control 
of daily life by the security forces that protected landed interests and economic production 
(Wood 2003, 20-24). 
The early signs of what would become the FMLN guerrilla insurgency emerged in 
the 1960s and early 1970s, when demands for land reform and increased political inclusion 
sparked the development of community-based organizations. Their reform efforts directly 
challenged the alliance of the military and landed oligarchy that controlled all land and 
economic production. Civilian groups mobilized in response to political discrimination: 
popular participation was restricted in elections, and fraud was common. Radical leftist 
organizations and urban trade unions which were established and coordinated by the few 
armed revolutionary groups operating in the country at the time expanded in the cities and 
organized frequent demonstrations and strikes. Political mobilization expanded rapidly in the 
countryside. In realizing that their only means to effect change–through the ballot–was 
unavailable, the campesinos who joined the movements perceived “no other way out” 
(Goodwin 2001) than armed struggle. Significant tensions and violence escalated over the 
course of the 1970s before the war’s full outbreak. The political climate in the country 
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worsened as the organizations’ efforts were met with increasingly brutal repression and 
violent confrontations.  
 Amid the divisive effects of armed resistance on the ruling establishment, a small 
sect of young, reform-minded military officers in 1979 carried out a coup and took power of 
the Salvadoran government. In response, senior officers led by Major General Roberto 
d’Aubuisson exercised severe repression against any groups or individuals suspected of 
collusion with leftist forces. With the support of the economic elites, d’Aubuisson’s 
conservative cohort ousted the short-lived reformist junta in 1980, later joined by civilian 
politicians from the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Christian Democrat José Napoléon 
Duarte was later named president of the junta (Byrne 1996, 94). (He later ran as the PDC 
candidate in the 1984 presidential elections and won in a second-round runoff). In 1980, 
more than 1,500 people were killed monthly as a result of political violence. The 
assassination in March of that year of Archbishop Oscar Romero the day after he called on 
government soldiers to refuse to obey orders (Wood 2003, 26-7)–and the firing by armed 
forces on people marching at his funeral, killing 40–were catalyzing moments for wider 
participation in opposing the state. 
In November 1980, the FMLN was founded, encompassing five guerrilla 
organizations that were formed in the 1970s to advocate resistance against the government’s 
unjust policies and a struggle for political representation of marginalized groups. The five 
organizations were the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL); the Popular Liberation Forces 
(FPL); the Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP); the National Resistance (RN); and the 
Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PTRC). The FMLN and opposition 
political parties soon forged a common front, the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR)-
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FMLN. France, Mexico and the Socialist International officially recognized the FMLN-FDR 
as a “representative political force,” affirming its status as a broad-based social movement 
(Ryan 1994, 38). In January 1981, the newly consolidated FMLN launched a joint military 
attack–called the “final offensive”–intended to overthrow the régime, which failed. 
Escalation of the Conflict and Settlement 
Following this defeat, the FMLN retreated from the cities and gradually acquired 
control of rural areas in eastern, central and northern parts of the country, comparable to the 
pockets of Tribal Trust Lands in which ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas operated during the 
Rhodesian conflict. The FMLN’s strategy emphasized large-scale attacks on military and 
economic infrastructure targets. Between 1981 and 1983, the rebels gained ground on 
government forces and expanded its control of territory. The military attacked FMLN-
controlled areas without discrimination, and death squads executed civilians suspected of 
supporting the armed opposition. 
In response to the state’s brutal violence against civilians, in late 1983 U.S. officials 
conditioned its provision of funding, training and arms supplies to the Salvadoran armed 
forces on improvement of its human rights record and restraint of the military (Wood 2003, 
29). In the 1984 presidential election and in legislative polls a year later, the Christian 
Democratic party won, allowing the United States to reinstate and strengthen military aid to 
El Salvador in support of a government viewed internationally as more legitimate and 
moderate in its war against the insurgents. The shift in government strategy away from 
violence against civilians that followed had multiple effects: the FMLN’s reorganization into 
small, mobile units and covert infiltration of wider rural and urban areas; a shift in the 
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rightist ARENA party toward more moderate leaders and away from d’Aubuisson to appeal 
to a wider constituency; and a reaffirmation of U.S. material support. From 1984 to 1989, 
the FMLN’s transition to covert guerrilla tactics coincided with a deliberate strategy of 
renewing its political efforts and the “reactivation of the masses” (Byrne 1996, 158) that the 
rebels saw as critical to demonstrating that the counterinsurgency policy was failing. All 
insurgent strategies at this time were oriented toward a planned counteroffensive attack 
combined with a violent popular uprising that would lead to an unquestionable takeover of 
power by the rebels (158-160). 
Carrying out the murders of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her sixteen-year-
old daughter was the Salvadoran High Command’s reaction to the successful FMLN 
offensive into San Salvador in November 1989, when it occupied two wealthy suburbs of the 
city for several days. The Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador later 
named President Alfredo Cristiani of the ruling ARENA party as having ordered the 
assassinations (Truth Commission 1993, 45-54). The murders shocked the nation, resulted in 
a suspension of U.S. military aid conditioned on progress in peace talks, and in short, forced 
the parties to the table. 
Stalemate, Peace Talks and an Agreement 
The FMLN’s 1989 offensive was a turning point in the conflict, providing a signal to 
both parties that neither was positioned to win militarily anytime soon. Perceptions of the 
“mutually hurting stalemate” led the government and the FMLN to approach the United 
Nations separately for assistance in December. Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (SRSG) Álvaro de Soto led the negotiations, which began in Geneva in April 1990 
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(Söderberg Kovacs 2007, 66). Negotiations of a series of accords took place over a two-year 
period and ended in a final peace agreement on December 31, 1991. The government agreed 
to reduce and reconstruct the military, disband the security forces and establish a new 
civilian police force that included FMLN members. The judiciary and electoral systems 
would undergo significant reforms, the latter to include a broader spectrum of political 
parties (de Soto et al 1995, 192). The rebels committed to disarm, accept the terms of the 
existing constitution and enter the political system as a legal party. 
A newly formed National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), 
comprising two representatives each from the government and the FMLN and one 
representative from every other political party, would oversee implementation of the 
accords. The agreement established a Truth Commission to investigate and document 
wartime human rights violations and a U.N. observer and verification mission (ONUSAL). 
The U.N. mission was to monitor and verify ceasefire violations, the separation of forces 
and the disarmament and demobilization of FMLN combatants. In February 1992 a formal 
ceasefire began. In December of that year, when the FMLN had fully disarmed and 
demobilized as verified by ONUSAL, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal recognized the FMLN 
as a legally constituted political party. 
 
International and Regional Influence on the Rebels: A Driver of Conflict and 
 Compromise 
 El Salvador’s “negotiated revolution” (Karl 1992)–the peace process between the 
government and the FMLN in which the United Nations played a powerful mediating role–
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redrew the lines of legitimacy, contention and politics in society. U.N. SRSG Álvaro de Soto 
argues that the accords aimed to eradicate the causes of the conflict: “a militarized society, 
riven by profound economic and social inequalities and a closed political system” (de Soto et 
al 1995, 189). The Salvadoran peace process was the first time the United Nations acted as a 
mediator in a civil war (Whitfield 1999, quoted in Wade 2008, 38). 
While proponents of regional peace efforts and the United Nations–in particular, 
Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and de Soto–played a central role in ending the 
civil war, other external actors–particularly the United States, Cuba and Nicaragua–shaped 
the formation of the FMLN insurgency, the evolution of the conflict and the strategies of 
the government and the rebels on the ground. The rebels’ decision to disarm and abandon 
armed struggle and ultimately the success of the peace process depended on the presence of 
a military stalemate and the demonstrated will of both parties toward negotiated settlement. 
As decisively, the changing nature of the international environment and the shifting interests 
of major international actors permitted the building of political momentum, capacity and the 
possibility for compromise that led to an agreement accommodating the interests of both 
parties. 
Revolution, Ideology and Cold War Politics–Cuba, Nicaragua and the United States in El Salvador 
The geopolitical landscape that framed the external dimensions of the Salvadoran 
conflict interacted in significant ways with the internal incompatibility between the rebels 
and the régime, shaping the actors’ interests, identities and capabilities. The end of the Cold 
War altered the strategic environment for both parties to the civil conflict (Call 2002, 387). 
As a result of the Soviet collapse, the continued material assistance and ideological 
connection of regional allies Cuba and Nicaragua, on whose enormous logistical support and 
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solidarity the FMLN relied, was likely to decline. Moreover, Call argues that the Cold War’s 
end removed an ideological framework that had influenced the FMLN’s vision for post-
conflict El Salvador (2002, 387). The rebels then more clearly embraced democratization; 
worked within the realistic parameters of the conflict and impasse; and were more willing to 
compromise at the negotiating table. The thinking of the U.S. government changed with the 
shift from the Reagan administration to that of George H.W. Bush, and the United States, 
along with the Soviet Union, expressed public support for negotiations–which until the 
communist threat no longer loomed, had constituted too large a risk. Without U.S. material 
support, the peace process became a significantly more attractive option to the Salvadoran 
military, particularly following the rebels’ 1989 offensive and the emergence of a mutually-
hurting stalemate. 
The FMLN insurgency developed in the immediate wake of a successful Sandinista 
guerrilla campaign in neighboring Nicaragua, which had ended with the toppling of the 
Somoza régime in July 1979. The Sandinistas’ success was in part determined by support 
from the Soviet Union and Cuba. The momentum of rebel victory infected the incipient 
Salvadoran guerrillas in their early resistance efforts against the state. In a scenario not unlike 
regional cooperation among the recently victorious revolutionary governments in 
Mozambique and Zambia and their provision of safe haven for Rhodesian and other 
guerrillas in southern Africa, the Sandinistas offered the FMLN and other Latin American 
guerrilla groups the use of Nicaragua as a base for operations and weapons shipments. 
Cuba’s sponsorship of the rebels was contingent on the merger of the three Salvadoran 
guerrilla factions, who were in bitter disagreement over the strategic direction the insurgency 
should adopt. The Cuban régime exerted influence on the joint rebel coalition and together 
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with Nicaragua secured a regional “clearinghouse” (Moroni 1995) for foreign assistance to 
the FMLN. In addition, every guerrilla faction in Latin America, with the exception of Peru’s 
Shining Path, contributed to the FMLN war effort, through money, arms and personnel. 
The FMLN FDR–the international political arm of the movement–successfully established a 
support network that transcended the region, including Vietnam and the Soviet Union, 
which provided training and funds until late in the war (Moroni 1995, 6-7). This 
impenetrable flow of aid sustained the FMLN throughout the conflict and variously 
impacted rebel calculations about their ability to fight the long war. 
The Soviet Union’s decision to halt arms shipments to Nicaragua’s Sandinista 
government in early 1989 “knocked the revolutionary perspective off balance,” according to 
an FMLN leader (Karl 1992, 151). Rebel leaders began to distance themselves from the 
socialist revolution and called for multi-party democracy. 
The United States impacted the development of the conflict in fundamental ways. It 
played a role attributed to political elites who are in control of strategic spikes in violence 
during civil war peace processes: the U.S. government was able indirectly to “turn the tap” 
(Sisk 2009) of violence on and off through its actions and reactions in the face of brutal 
warfare and rights violations in El Salvador. Fluctuations in U.S. military assistance–
calibrated by varied, inconsistent commitments to human rights-based conditions and 
geopolitical strategy to preclude the ascent of another communist government in the region–
shaped the advantages and outcomes of the conflict on the battlefield. When the United 
States provided increased assistance to the Salvadoran government in 1979, it did so with 
conditions: the military junta had to incorporate the Christian Democratic party into 
government, elections had to be held and agrarian reform had to be carried out (Wood 2003, 
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27). U.S. officials promoted the drafting of a new constitution in 1983 and spent $1.8 billion 
on the 1984 election to ensure Duarte’s victory. U.S. economic aid from 1980 to 1991 to El 
Salvador totaled $3.15 billion; military aid reached $1.1 billion (Call 2002, 386). 
Developments in U.S. politics affected the amount and kind of assistance it provided 
to the Salvadoran government. From 1979 to 1981, the focus of the Carter administration’s 
policy toward El Salvador was preventing the rise of a leftist, pro-communist government as 
had occurred in Nicaragua; and on effecting human rights protections by linking aid 
disbursement to improvements in compliance with rights standards determined by the U.S. 
Congress. Carter withdrew aid immediately following the murders of several U.S. citizens 
working in El Salvador in December 1980–three American nuns and a laywoman–and two 
land reform advisors the following month. 
The FMLN’s timing of its “final offensive” in January 1981 was intended to bring 
the guerrillas to power before President Ronald Reagan’s inauguration later in the month. 
The failure of the offensive boosted the urgency of U.S. aid to El Salvador, and Congress 
approved $10 million in assistance before Reagan assumed office. The Reagan 
administration increased aid to the Salvadoran military–in the form of training, funds, arms 
and helicopters–as the war progressed. Until the end of the Cold War, the Reagan 
government succeeded in ramping up economic and military aid to El Salvador–first by 
executive decree and later by congressional appropriation. A decisive shift in U.S. foreign 
policy under President George H.W. Bush away from a military-based strategy toward clear 




The efforts of U.S. citizens to draw policymakers’ attention to violence by 
Salvadoran state actors against civilians and to the U.S. role in training and arming the 
security forces led U.S. government officials in late 1983 to pressure and convince 
Salvadoran military leaders to curb the military’s human rights violations. This precipitated a 
rapid decline in war-related deaths beginning in 1984 (Wood 2003, 28). 
While the direct sponsors of the warring parties exercised critical leverage on the 
régime and the guerrillas, including by shaping their evolving strategies and goals, the United 
Nations as a mediator and the FMLN’s international supporters–including Mexico, Costa 
Rica, Norway and other European  governments–played important roles in facilitating the 
battlefield-to-negotiating table transition. Their financial and technical assistance at key 
moments of the peace process maintained the momentum of the negotiations and 
contributed to implementation efforts and transitional institution-building. 
Other Forms of International Influence on the Rebels and the Conflict 
When the military stalemate became evident to the warring parties following the 
1989 San Salvador offensive, the FMLN approached the United Nations with a request for 
assistance in negotiating a settlement, which was followed by a similar request from the 
Cristiani government (Wade 2008, 38). Stalemate, for the rebels, signaled an opportune 
moment for the involvement of U.N. mediators. They believed that the legitimization of an 
internationally-sponsored peace process was critical to their voices being heard during 
negotiations and preventing the gains of the armed struggle from being lost at the table. The 
‘good offices’ of U.N. Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who took a particular 
interest in negotiating an end to the conflict by the end of his term, were critical in 
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conveying that the United Nations was committed to bringing a settlement to fruition; Pérez 
de Cuéllar, a Peruvian, believed that his successor, likely not also a Latin American, would 
not take the same interest in ending El Salvador’s conflict. It must be noted that the United 
Nations, stinging from botched interventions in African conflicts in the early 1990s, was 
particularly interested in a successful Salvadoran peace process to rebuild confidence in the 
institution’s ability to carry out its mission of international peace and security. The U.N. 
commitment to democratic stabilization in El Salvador was unprecedented, however, and its 
role in “the resolution of an internal conflict from start to finish” (Call 2002, 384)–from 
mediation, observation and verification to electoral oversight–was essential to the success of 
the process. 
Members of the FMLN’s international political liaison, the Political Diplomatic 
Commission, were sent to 33 countries as official representatives to generate support for the 
movement. The FMLN enjoyed significant support from the governments of Mexico, 
Panama, Costa Rica, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic. Solidarity and diaspora groups 
in the United States, Europe and Latin America–many composed of Salvadoran refugees–
provided political and material support to the rebels and were critical to building opposition 
against U.S. policies in El Salvador (Söderberg Kovacs 2007, 79). During the post-agreement 
transition the FMLN received a large amount of support from Social Democratic parties, 
trade unions and NGOs in Norway, Sweden and Spain–including the leasing of office space, 
financial assistance and the training of party representatives and candidates (Wade 2008, 48). 
In addition to international recognition and support for the rebels, the regional 
commitment to peace and democracy by the Central American presidents during the 1986-
87 Esquipulas peace process constructed an environment conducive to a negotiated 
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settlement in El Salvador. In an initiative led by Costa Rican President Oscar Arías, the 
Esquipulas Accords emphasized proposals calling for democratization, arms control 
negotiations and national reconciliation. It was signed by five Central American presidents in 
1987 while civil conflicts were raging in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. The initiative 
provided momentum for the move toward settlement in El Salvador. 
In an article in Foreign Policy in the spring of 1989, FMLN commander Joaquín 
Villalobos’ defended Marxism-Leninism as a social science theory, not a militant 
revolutionary ideology. Moreover, in an attempt to secure international visibility and support 
for a credible FMLN vision and struggle, Villalobos argued that the FMLN’s military tactics 
are aimed at securing the support of society in pursuit of a “broad, democratic and realistic 
historical goal” (1989, 107). In the context of the end of the Cold War, his ideas assumed a 
conciliatory but defensive tone. The rebels wanted to hold onto the notion of revolution and 
maintain international recognition as a representative, legitimate force in Salvadoran politics. 
The government shared the FMLN’s aim of gaining international legitimacy and 
approval. During the transition period and following elections, the Government and the 
FMLN requested that the U.N. Observer Mission ONUSAL’s mandate be renewed (de Soto 
1995, 193). The desire for an extended source of legitimate, external verification can be 
compared to Mugabe’s request that British administration in the pre-election period be six 
months long as opposed to the eight weeks proposed by the Thatcher government. While 
Mugabe’s motivation was in part explained by concerns about the return of thousands of 
refugee ZANU-PF supporters from Mozambique and their registration as voters, the parties’ 
reliance on an international guarantor illustrates the advantage that international legitimacy 
provides rebels and régimes in transitions from war. In El Salvador and Zimbabwe, 
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preserving order and peace following an agreement was in the interest of the rebels who 
anticipated a renewed opportunity for demonstrating their political legitimacy in upcoming 
elections.  
 
Popular Support for the FMLN–Transforming Guerrilla War into Votes 
 In Maoist military doctrine guerrillas are likened to fish swimming in a sea of 
peasants, who provide logistical support to the rebel militants. The overall guiding strategy 
of the FMLN during the Salvadoran civil conflict was “Prolonged Popular War”–a term 
borrowed from Asian revolutionary thought–which in El Salvador took the form of politico-
military guerrilla warfare (Moroni 1995, 13-15). By 1983, when the FMLN had gained a 
strong foothold in rural areas and established military operations throughout the country, it 
shifted its focus to building political relations with civilians through social service provisions 
and establishing local “popular” governments (Call 2002, 385-6). The rebels aimed to secure 
the peasants’ logistical coordination–or at minimum, to prevent them from aiding the 
régime. The rebels’ fundamental strategy was to isolate the people from the armed forces 
and prevent the military from gaining political support, combined with strengthening the 
political capacity and connections of the FMLN with “the masses” (Byrne 1996, 132-3). 
The centrality of land to the conflict created an immediate constituency as it did in 
Rhodesia, and the early supporters of resistance based on land and labor reform provided a 
critical foundation on which the FMLN sought to build its political project. In addition, the 
FMLN used appeals to ideology and solidarity to construct support among civilians. Social 
justice, particularly with regard to land, was a rallying cry for the rebels in mobilizing 
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marginalized groups in the country (Lyons 2005, 46). Exploiting class differences as a basis 
for mobilization may be a rebel strategy designed to co-opt marginalized, resource-poor 
groups who have no recourse to other means of representation or protection in a climate of 
insecurity. These groups, like the rebels, feel that they have “no other way out” (Goodwin 
2001), and the insurgents capitalize on this sense of impoverishment and injustice among the 
“marginalized have-nots” (Lyons 2005, 47). 
 In distributing “selective incentives,” the FMLN leaders and militants provided 
targeted services to the rural poor, including redistribution of land and the coordination of 
development projects. The FMLN also charged war taxes in areas where it operated from 
“zonas controladas” (Moroni 1995, 46). Some Salvadorans participated in high-risk collective 
action, even when the collective benefits of redistributed land, for example were available to 
those who did not participate because participants valued the “pleasure of agency” (Wood 
2003) that peasants gained in making their own history. “The resolution of the puzzle of 
collective action depends on emotional processes, moral perceptions, and shifting political 
culture as well as on the emergence of insurgent social networks and widening political 
opportunity” (2003, 20). 
As demonstrated by the key role played by guerrillas and war veterans in Zimbabwe, 
the most important and accessible constituency of a rebel movement may be its soldiers. 
Who comprised FMLN combatant forces? The majority of insurgent combatants were from 
poor rural backgrounds (McClintock 1998, 266-7). During the early years of the war, the 
rebels expanded their forces from a few hundred combatants in 1981 to several thousand by 
1984. This recruitment–much of it forced–occurred in the countryside. Moroni cites the 
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permanent effort of the FMLN to recruit combatants and expand its support base as a 
fundamental reason for its survival (1995, 6-10). 
Expansion of Political Opportunity for FMLN Constituents 
 El Salvador’s “unequal distribution of land, income and opportunity and its 
maintenance by coercive labor practices” (Wood 2003, 24) resulted in a campesino political 
culture until the late 1960s in which resistance was quieted by self-censored peasants. 
Landless laborers lacked schooling or any opportunity for upward mobility and were 
dependent on their employers for shelter, food and work. The prospects for change were 
dim given the severe repression by military security forces of any attempts to organize or 
enact land tenure reforms. The rural poor were politically excluded until the 1970s, when 
liberation theology–including the notion of social justice–and the efforts of the Christian 
Democratic party and covert guerrilla organizations reached them and fueled gradual 
political mobilization in the countryside. The opportunities for political activity widened 
exponentially, and as a result, in the areas where politicization and grassroots organizing had 
no history, popular support for the rebels was high (Wood 2003). 
The expansion of wartime opportunities had implications for post-conflict political 
participation: the campesinos-turned-fully franchised citizens, in the immediate aftermath of a 
violent struggle for political rights and access to land in which they have been direct 
participants, cast votes in a renovated political milieu. The process of re-enfranchisement 
was neither inevitable nor bloodless, and people’s decisions to contribute or take up arms 
were sometimes made for them. However, through the war, the campesinos became agents of 
social change and acquired a political identity, despite high risks and often little protection 
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offered by the FMLN in return for their support. “Most civilian insurgents appeared to 
support the guerrilla forces not out of an illusory desire for protection but out of their 
deepening conviction that the government no longer merited their loyalty or acquiescence” 
(Wood 2003, 120). 
Popular support in rural communities–and in urban areas, which entailed different 
kinds of civilian cooperation–was inconsistent and changeable. Diverse modes of 
mobilization by the rebels–including forced recruitment and organizing workers around calls 
for labor reform–varied with shifts in the FMLN strategy over time and with the risks to 
civilians of involvement in providing aid to rebels. The forms of collective action differ 
depending on multiple, interactive factors–for example, militants’ needs, community benefits 
and the level of state-sponsored violence. Though outside the scope of this research, within-
case analysis of different types, degrees and motivations of popular backing over time and in 
different locations would generate concrete understanding of complex processes, aiding in 
theory development. As the FMLN strategy evolved over the twelve-year period of armed 
conflict, the level of campesino participation fluctuated, developing endogenously and gaining 
its own momentum. As a military stalemate approached, this trend only drove the rebels 
closer to peace talks. 
 
Impact of the Electoral System on Rebels’ Decision to Become Politicians 
Samuel Huntington argued that “perhaps the most important and obvious but also 
most neglected fact about successful great revolutions is that they do not occur in 
democratically elected systems” (Huntington 1968, 275). This trend is likely not due to an 
inherent immunity of democratic systems to revolutionary penetration, but the historical 
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pattern highlights the difficulty that non-state actors face in constructing a sufficiently large 
and viable coalition against the government, which has entrenched advantages and the 
support of at least certain sectors of society (Ryan 1994). The FMLN did not manage to 
overthrow an elected government, but the proportional representation (PR) electoral system 
permitted the rebels opportunities in the post-conflict election that would not have been 
available under another system. Proponents of institutionalist, and rational choice 
perspectives seek to advance the idea that rebel groups will agree to enter the political arena 
due in part to the incentives they anticipate as a result of the particular type of electoral 
system in place–or reforms that might be made to the system that favor their participation 
(Shugart 1992). 
Ryan sees prospects of revolutionary success as dependent on the scope of the 
revolutionaries’ anti-régime coalition in terms of size and socio-political breadth (1994, 29). 
Some scholars have characterized the process of coalition-building in revolutionary 
situations as a direct competition between the rebels and the régime (Wickham-Crowley 
1992). The FMLN indeed conceptualized the civil conflict in this way: their politico-military 
efforts were centered on “crowding out” the government and ensuring that the régime’s 
political influence and propaganda, recruitment strategies and defense of status quo policies 
did not reach or persuade the people. This required a significant amount of mobilization in 
part because rural Salvadorans had become “acquiescent” (Wood 2003) over years of 
political marginalization and systemic discrimination. As discussed in the previous section, 
the FMLN’s efforts in some areas of the countryside to co-opt the campesinos met with 




Institutional Opportunities provided by Electoral System Design 
Scholars have long emphasized the implications of institutional engineering–
particularly of electoral systems–in democratization processes. Electoral system design is 
used as a tool in constitutional engineering to mitigate conflict in divided societies and an 
important mechanism for shaping wider political practices that have an impact beyond the 
elections (Reilly 2002, 127). Shugart identifies electoral incentives and reforms as important 
considerations in a rebel group’s decision to negotiate a political settlement to an internal 
conflict and compete in democratic elections. Peace agreements that lead to elections out of 
which guerrillas emerge as political parties can be understood as “a product of calculations 
of the costs of continued conflict versus the costs of electoral competition for each side” 
(Shugart 1992, 121). 
Certain institutional rules and reforms provide particular opportunities to guerrillas 
in their transitions to politics. New political parties are more likely to emerge and succeed 
where candidates are elected in PR legislative systems rather than in single-member voting 
districts (Taagepara and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 2004). By preventing the overrepresentation 
or underrepresentation of political parties, most forms of PR voting allow for more parties–
particularly outsider or smaller parties–to participate in representative bodies and succeed 
politically even when they capture only a small percentage of the vote (Allison 2006, 152). 
PR rules are likely to facilitate proportional parliamentary representation of all parties 
regardless of the extent or distribution of their support base; PR particularly encourages 
political coalition-building (Reilly 2002, 127-130). In El Salvador, 84 delegates to the 
unicameral legislative body, the National Assembly, are elected for three-year terms through 
a two-tiered district PR voting system. Voters cast a single ballot for the party of their 
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choice; this ballot is then applied to candidate lists at both the district and national levels 
(Allison 2006, 155). 
Comparative electoral system analysis of presidential contests demonstrates that a 
majority runoff system facilitates the accession to politics of a new political party more easily 
than plurality electoral rules (Carey et al 1992). If no candidate receives a majority–50 
percent of the vote plus one–a runoff is held between the two candidates with the highest 
vote in the first round. 
Institutional Reform and Widened Democratic Space: Incentives for the FMLN’s Embrace of 
Politics 
Reform of the electoral system in El Salvador was a critical component of the 
democratic transition that preceded, paralleled and followed the armed conflict. One of the 
most important legacies of the Chapultepec Peace Accords was its transformation of the 
FMLN into a legal political party (Allison 2006, 145). In addition to this transition which 
itself served as a major democratic aperture and incentive in the eyes of the rebels, 
liberalization of the electoral system to mandate full participation by all sectors of the eligible 
electorate was an essential rebel demand and a primary raison d’être of the FMLN. This 
process of political opening took place beginning in the early 1980s, when the rebels’ “final 
offensive” posed an early version of stalemate: though the attack failed, the FMLN 
demonstrated its capacity to mount military operations throughout the country and that the 
FMLN-FDR political coalition was large and broad enough to generate a political and 
military stalemate (Ryan 1994, 38). 
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Initial electoral reforms began with the 1983 constitution drafted by a 60-member 
constituent assembly elected the year before, following the takeover in 1980 by the military 
junta. The constitution established a more pluralistic political system and arranged for 
presidential and legislative elections to be held in 1984 and 1985, respectively; these were 
deemed the most free and fair elections in El Salvador in fifty years. Throughout failed peace 
talks in 1984, the FMLN demanded significant changes to the electoral system be made prior 
to their participation in elections; its costs of resistance and continued armed conflict 
remained relatively low. The rebels did not participate in the 1985 elections and boycotted 
elections in 1989 (Shugart 1992, 140). To induce the rebels away from armed struggle, any 
new political system would have to include concessions from the régime of sufficient 
provisions for widening the rebels’ opportunities for electoral participation, specifically 
through changes to the electoral system. 
Amid a mutually-hurting stalemate and the move toward U.N. mediation of peace 
negotiations in late 1989, the rebels received the concrete institutional opening that justified 
its abandonment of violence. During peace talks in 1990, a negotiated reform of the electoral 
system expanded the number of seats from 60 to 84 deputies in an effort to widen the 
political opportunities available to smaller parties. COPAZ–the multi-party body created by 
the peace agreement to enact legislation in fulfillment of accord provisions–selected the 
members of a new Supreme Electoral Tribunal, established through constitutional reform to 
replace the Central Board of Elections. During the Mexico Agreements in April 1991, the 
warring parties agreed that the electoral roll would be compiled in such a way that the lists of 
citizens eligible to vote are published at least twenty days before the date of the election. 
Legally registered parties would have the right to monitor the preparation, organization, 
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publication and updating of the electoral rolls through the establishment of an Interpartidaria, 
a body which incorporated the country’s nine political parties and could be called on to 
review electoral and judicial reforms (U.N. DPI 1995). These technical reforms provided 
additional incentives to the FMLN to participate and win seats as a new party in an 
increasingly inclusive and open system. 
In selecting a candidate to run in the 1994 presidential election, the FMLN agreed 
not to nominate a rebel leader or commander. The FMLN leadership calculated that the 
Salvadoran population was not ready for as radical a choice as casting a vote for an ex-rebel 
leader (Söderberg Kovacs 2007, 67). The rebels’ political support was not yet fully 
consolidated; though the FMLN’s legitimacy-building process was boosted by rebels’ signing 
the peace agreement–polls showed that the public strongly favored a negotiated solution to 
the conflict (Ryan 1994, 39)–achieving solid electoral backing require more than cautious 
election campaign choices. Aware of the public’s vivid memory of wartime violence and its 
discredited Marxist-Leninist framework, the FMLN strategically sought to expand its 
political space through coalition-building. The rebels moderated by running in the 
presidential race on a coalition ticket with the Convergencia Democrática (Democratic 
Convergence, CD) party–itself a coalition of three leftist parties headed by Rubén Zamora, a 
longtime political ally of the FMLN. 
Salvadoran presidents are elected for five-year terms, without the possibility of 
consecutive re-election. In the 1994 presidential election, the ARENA candidate Armando 
Calderón Sol received 49.3 percent of votes and the FMLN-CD candidate Zamora received 
25.6 percent. As a result, a runoff became necessary, and Calderón won in a landslide 
victory–68.3 to 31.6 percent (PDBA 1999). In each of the country’s fourteen departments, 
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the FMLN received fewer votes in the second round presidential vote than ARENA. Unlike 
the results of the February 1980 post-conflict election in Zimbabwe–in which votes cast 
clearly delineated ZANU’s and ZAPU’s regional support bases–FMLN support was not 
limited to particular areas. The rebels had not consolidated political backing sufficiently 
thoroughly to contest the ARENA platform in any one region. In 1994 legislative elections, 
the FMLN received 21 out of 84 seats, emerging as the primary opposition party. The 
rebels-turned-politicians secured a greater percentage of votes in San Salvador and urban 
centers than in rural areas; overall in municipal elections they performed poorly. 
Both during and after the war, the FMLN understood the value of cultivating wider 
social space to achieve political success. The party’s awareness of its limited, inconsistent 
popular backing throughout the country and its concerns about voters’ perceptions of their 
radical identity as a guerrilla movement led them to form a coalition in their first presidential 
race. Their strategic calculations were shaped not only by an anticipated higher number of 
votes by running with another party, but by their association with leftist revolutionary 
ideology amid the end of the Cold War and the disrepute of communist thought. Moreover, 
the FMLN’s associations with extant political parties, civil society groups and social 
movements that were a product of the widespread grassroots mobilization of the 1970s 
informed and enhanced its political organization strategy in the two years leading up to the 
1994 elections after the peace agreement had been finalized. Process-tracing of FMLN 
decision-making and its refusal to concede demands from the régime–on electoral changes 
as well as military and land reforms–until a ripe moment, combined with the government’s 
willingness to negotiate, made a U.N.-mediated and verified peace process and 
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implementation the internationally-legitimizing path which the rebels sought, and the most 
secure guarantee that the accords would be implemented. 
 
Conclusions  
Resolution of the Salvadoran conflict and implementation of the peace accords have 
been monitored closely since the agreement was signed by the rebels and the Cristiani 
government. Beyond the establishment of the former rebel movement as the opposition 
party since the mid-1990s, demilitarization and reform of the security forces is viewed as a 
critical success of the accords. While rational choice calculations about seats, votes and 
political space are an insightful analytical tool in the examination of the FMLN’s post-
conflict transition to politics–and their anticipated popular backing and capacity to build 
coalitions–the FMLN’s considerations can be explained by the overall benefits perceived by 
the rebel movement of its re-constitution as a legal, political actor in an internationally 
recognized, newly structured electoral system. 
The rebels’ perceptions of their legitimized role in the peace process and democratic 
consolidation of El Salvador–a stated objective of their revolutionary mission, particularly as 
the end of the war drew closer–were equally important in the strategic transition from 
violence to contentious politics. The FMLN’s rural supporters–despite high risks and unclear 
rewards–were a critical force in shaping the rebels’ emergence as a group with which the 
government had to come to terms for the war to end (Wood 2003, 30). The rebels’ domestic 
legitimization occurred through “local political processes of insurgency, such as the path-
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dependent consequences of political violence and the assertion of agency by long-
subordinate people” (2003, 254). 
The interaction of two factors–international influence on the rebels and the 
anticipated reconstructive effects of a reformed electoral system on the political “rules of the 
game”–emerge in an analysis of rebel decision-making as a salient explanation for the FMLN 
guerrillas’ commitment to the negotiated settlement of a military conflict that was losing 



















4  Dynamics of constitutive interaction in transitions from 
violence to politics 
 
Efforts to understand modern civil wars and their termination require examination 
of the interactions between states and non-state entities battling for control of government. 
The strategic behavior of actors in internal conflict relies on the manipulation of violence 
and collective incentives in a struggle to build legitimacy–participation as a legal actor in a 
political system of accepted rules and standards. A growing number of civil wars and 
separatist conflicts, particularly in the post-Cold War era, have been resolved peacefully 
through negotiated settlements in which rebels disarmed and entered the political arena. In 
other conflicts revolutionaries have held fast to violence and continued to shun the political 
system. Comparative analysis of the El Salvador and Zimbabwe case studies aims to get at 
the conditions under which rebel movements engaged in violent conflict with states decide 
to disarm and participate as political actors. 
The circumstances characterizing the environments in which rebels make the 
decision to enter politics–including international influence on the rebel movement, 
characteristics of domestic political institutions and level of popular support for the rebels–
have a traceable impact on the rebel decision-making. A more nuanced understanding of the 
reasons that insurgents enter politics will contribute to potential explanations for variations 
in rebel groups’ post-war political status–whether or not they become functioning parties–
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and in the durability of peace. In examining the roles that factors such as political incentives, 
violence and civilian support play in relations among states and non-state domestic actors, 
the dynamics of transitional decision-making by rebels who have taken up arms against the 
state are illustrative of when, how and why civil wars come to an end. Studying them may 
spur the gradual development of a theory of transformation from violence to politics within 
states. 
 
Transitions from Violence to Politics 
Aside from the “credible commitment” provided by a third-party guarantor of the 
belligerents’ safety in the post-conflict period, few explanations exist for the decisive 
termination of civil wars (Walter 1997, 340). Rationalists point to the cost-benefit 
calculations of combatants as impediments to the resolution of intrastate wars: domestic 
enemies will only settle if they believe they could do no better by continuing to fight or 
continuing to bargain. Walter describes the “ideational school” as comprised of those who 
view civil wars as “intense value conflicts” that preclude compromise due to their emotional, 
often identity-linked nature (Walter 1997, 343). Amid this simplistic conceptual background, 
in an effort toward theory development, scholars who seek to explain transitions from civil 
war must contextualize and explore the complex mechanisms and processes that shape the 
emergence of political alternatives through settlement. 
In taking up this challenge, I have sought to address three theoretically-oriented 
questions about the transition from violence to politics and the mechanisms through which 
this occurs. First, how do political systems and conventions change to construct conditions 
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amenable to combatants’ accession to politics, over continuing the conflict militarily? 
Second, a rebel movement’s calculations about its own popular support–a key consideration 
in decisions to compete with ballots rather than bullets–are related to the type of electoral 
system in place and the potential for domestic political reforms to mitigate the costs to the 
rebels and the regime of political competition versus continuing the conflict (Shugart 1992). 
How does the relationship between rebels and the civilian population affect these decisions? 
The social environment in which rebels operate and strategize–and the amount of popular 
and coalition support they anticipate in an initial post-war election–mold the choices of 
leaders regarding continuation of fighting or agreeing to compromise. The nature and 
evolution of the movement’s interests and identity also inform this decision. Third, what 
impact do external actors have on the conflict among endogenous actors? How do they 
affect the emergence of changes in rebels’ strategy and interests? This question aims to 
deconstruct regional and international actors’ varying impacts–constraints and enablement–
on the decisive transformation of rebels to politicians. 
Elements of a constructivist theoretical approach may help conceptualize the 
dynamics, interactions and constitutive mechanisms that characterize civil war and the 
processes that aim to terminate them. These three questions illustrate how different kinds of 
social structures reshape actors’ interests, self-understandings and behavior (Katzenstein 
1996). Through the “reciprocal interaction” (Wendt 1992) of conflict and compromise, 
agents and structures are mutually constituted. 
The chapter will first present conclusions drawn from the case study analysis, 
addressing each of the three questions in an effort to sketch a path toward a theoretical 
conception of transition from conflict to politics. Understanding the identities of combatants 
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and their constituencies; the nature of domestic and international political support; and the 
rebels’ use of violence are among the elements central to analysis of the rebel-to-politician 
transformation. A typology outlining the effects of the three variables on rebels’ decision-
making follows the conclusions (Figure 3, page 100). Next, I seek to analyze the ways in 
which constructivist theoretical approaches might be fruitfully applied to transitions from 
civil wars. Implications for the study of violence in civil war and developing theoretical 
perspectives on the transformation in this process are presented at the conclusion of the 
chapter. 
 
Toward a theory of transition from civil conflict: three points of departure 
What is the impact of external actors on actors endogenous to the conflict?  
This question has implications for comparative political analysis of violence-to-
politics transitions. While comparative scholars have concentrated on the impact of 
international norms, institutions and forces on domestic society less frequently and 
substantively than on the reverse effects, transitions from civil conflict provide an 
opportunity to examine effects on conflict and change in the international-domestic 
direction. 
The impact of international forces on the rebels in El Salvador and Zimbabwe took 
comparable forms: the Cold War and the revolutionary agendas of neighboring actors 
influenced the strategies and interests of the rebels. While the United Nations’ imprint on 
the Salvadoran peace process and implementation phase is striking, its effect differed 
significantly from the mediating role of the British in the Rhodesian conflict. U.N. efforts 
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arguably helped broaden opportunities for constructive engagement among the rebels and 
the régime in El Salvador. The British mediators’ focus on an outcome in the Lancaster 
House conference may have encouraged the continuation in the post-conflict period of the 
zero-sum politics characteristic of Zimbabwe. External actors in both cases served in 
different ways to legitimize the peace-building processes and the rebel parties themselves. 
The interaction of internal actors’ interests and strategies with those of external 
actors is critical to understanding the Salvadoran rebels’ transition to politics. For example, 
the FMLN’s adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology shifted as the Cold War drew to a close 
and Soviet Communism became increasingly discredited. From the movement’s founding, 
FMLN leaders were concerned with gaining international recognition as well as constructing 
domestic legitimacy. They aimed to be seen as a political movement with realistic, 
democratic goals for El Salvador–as Villalobos’ 1989 Foreign Policy article aiming to clarify the 
stance of the FMLN as a visionary, practical rebel movement with an attainable purpose 
demonstrated. 
Though the rebels were not internally unified over objectives and philosophy, in the 
lead-up to negotiations they aimed to present a coherent face to the United Nations, the 
international community and the Salvadoran régime. Their domestic-level goals were served 
by absorbing the impact of the tectonic shift occurring at the international level. Battlefield 
conditions clearly shaped the rebels’ ripeness for a transition to politics and their growing 
emphasis on the political dimension of struggle throughout the violent 1980s. But the degree 
and kind of U.S. assistance to the régime had direct effects on the military status of the 
conflict and the rebels’ decisions to embrace the bargaining table–a forum moderated and 
legitimized by the United Nations in its most comprehensive role to date. The FMLN rebels, 
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as actors engaged in struggles with multiple players–including its own leaders and 
constituents–became the main opposition party in 1994. Through this transformation, the 
interactive domestic and international environment in which the conflict unfolded partially 
reconstituted the rebels’ identity and interests as they entered electoral politics. 
ZANU’s and ZAPU’s reliance on neighboring former revolutionaries illustrates 
multiple-level interaction effects in the Rhodesian case. The Lancaster House conference 
and agreement emerged from the interaction of regional actors’ demands for an end to the 
Rhodesian conflict and the strategic dependence of Mugabe and Nkomo on Mozambique 
and Zambia. Somora Machel’s and Kenneth Kaunda’s pressure on the ZANU/ZAPU 
leaders to negotiate within the parameters of a British-mediated process was essential to the 
guerrillas’ decision to come to the table. Mugabe preferred the continuation of the conflict 
and was prepared to fight the long war, but this was not possible without the assistance and 
safe haven provided by Mozambique and Zambia. Though their specific ideological 
motivations differed, Machel’s and Kaunda’s interests in demanding an end to the war were 
shaped by economic needs; security against Rhodesian military actions against their 
territories; and the maintenance of their positions in the region as stable post-colonial 
régimes. 
Process tracing of the four negotiation attempts in Rhodesia by various international 
actors from 1974-1979, culminating in the Lancaster House agreement, illuminates rebels’ 
decision-making and the importance of iterative attempts at constructing peace. Any break in 
the mediation efforts would have concentrated so much attention on military activity that 
the negotiation threshold would have been raised significantly and the chances of achieving a 
settlement severely damaged (Low 1985, 107). The interactions of external and internal 
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actors’ perceptions and preferences through the series of mediation attempts by a wide range 
of external actors shaped what was ultimately on the table; the mediators’ and combatants’ 
strategies; and the final outcome. In-depth analysis of constitutive mechanisms embedded 
within international influence on the rebels may increase understanding of a particular case 
and aid in the development of theoretical conclusions with potentially wider applicability. 
In addition to material effects, normative influences also shape the behavior of rebel 
actors in conflict–often with concrete consequences. International lenders provide aid to 
governments with the implication that they will implement particular free-market policies. 
An evolving set of international peace-building norms–human rights standards, reform of 
security forces and combatant disarmament–generally guide the content of civil war peace 
agreements. The structural influence of global norms in such contexts not only molds actors’ 
behavior at the bargaining table but also provides space for external legitimization of internal 
actors’ efforts. Peceny and Stanley (2001) argue that political adversaries in El Salvador and 
Guatemala adopted liberal norms to increase their international legitimacy during civil 
conflict. Internationally mediated negotiations that lead to peace accords demonstrate to 
combatants that their adversaries have changed their preferences and can be trusted to 
abandon violence and follow the new political rules of the game. In El Salvador, 
international intervention and the acceptance by local actors of norms through “liberal social 
reconstruction” resulted in civil war resolution (Peceny et al 2001, 150-151). 
The varied motives of international actors–for example, the United Nations, World 
Bank, United States–interact with the objectives of rebels and regimes transitioning from 
conflict. As a result, domestic actors’ interests are shaped to take advantage of what 
international actors might offer, whether legitimacy or a loophole. The inter-subjectivity of 
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beliefs regarding the international presence–through mediation, peacekeeping, monitoring of 
peace agreement implementation, that it serves ultimately to provide an exploitable benefit 
of some kind–may translate differently to rebel and government actors. What results is a 
shifting of interests, identities and the adoption and reinforcement of norms through 
particular role enactments and behavioral practices in transitional periods–at the table, 
munitions depository or polling station. 
In his book on conflict in Bosnia, David Campbell argues that “the settled norms of 
international society–in particular, the idea that the national community requires the nexus of 
demarcated territory and fixed identity–were not only insufficient to enable a response to the 
Bosnian war, they were complicit in and necessary to the conduct of the war itself” 
(Campbell 1998, 13). Norms, internalized by domestic actors, frame the terms of the debate 
and shape the parameters of the meaning of conflict, compromise and implementation. 
How do rebels’ popular support and relationship with the civilian population affect decisions to 
disarm and enter politics? 
Structure and agent are co-constituted in conceptions of rebels’ perceived support 
among the population and the actions they take as a result of this assessment. If a rebel 
movement perceives that the degree to which it has mobilized the masses is sufficient to 
secure a reasonable number of parliamentary seats or for it to act as a spoiler (or prevail) in a 
presidential competition, then it may choose to enter the race (Shugart 1992, 122). If a group 
agrees or is pressured to enter an election by internal or external forces and later anticipates a 
weak performance at the polls, it may renege on a ceasefire or other disarmament 
commitments and distort the peace-building process. 
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The FMLN was able to capitalize on popular support in the initial post-conflict 
election in part because a significant proportion of the population, as disenfranchised and 
landless or land-poor citizens, supported the rebel cause and were willing to make sacrifices 
for its advancement. Rebel groups that have failed to gain sufficient backing from civilians 
were often hampered by an inability to communicate a clear political vision to the 
population, for example, the RUF in Sierra Leone. Rebel agents who invest in building local 
support by living “among the people,”–learning local terrain and languages and adopting a 
sensitivity in their political and military campaigns that reflects the interests of marginalized 
populations–may inspire reciprocal, longer-term popular investment but may perhaps be 
expected to provide a greater degree of protection to the population. 
The relationship between insurgents and their supporters, allies and associates defies 
clear typological categorization. The use of comparative, historical narratives has provided 
fine-grained analyses of the varying effects of rebel mobilization and military strategies in 
particular areas of civil conflicts–and the complex responses of the population to their 
efforts. Typically a small proportion of a particular population constitutes the guerrillas’ 
active supporters–those who serve as informants, combatants, organizers–and the remainder 
are passive (Kalyvas 2003). Wood found that in several areas in which the FMLN was active 
in El Salvador about one-third of the members of communities in which she conducted 
research were actively assisting the rebels (2003, 17). 
The collective incentives that rebels provide to local populations are shaped by the 
particular context of the conflict–its military, social and identity-based characteristics (Lyons 
2004, 41).  In aiming to secure popular support, rebels use “varying combinations of 
persuasion and coercion” (Kalyvas 2003, 101). Individuals’ choices to support the guerrilla 
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movement may be made under conditions of fear and insecurity, resulting in the 
exacerbation of ethnic, religious and identity-linked ties (Lyons 2004, 43-47). Inconsistent 
popular support may be explained by individuals’ changing commitment to the rebels, which 
varies over time with many factors, including: the physical risks the conflict entails; personal 
ties and allegiances; and the recruiting or coercive tactics the rebels employ. Wood identifies 
campesinos’ participation, defiance and “pleasure in agency” as “reasons for participation as 
well as expressions of the new political culture” (2003, 243). 
Local people may exploit the opportunity provided by the greater conflict to pursue 
private, identity-based conflicts not centrally related to the larger government-guerrilla 
struggle, as Kalyvas argues. Examining how “individual incentives for violence intersect with 
larger political and organizational processes” (Tarrow 2007, 588) is a key theoretical 
consideration in considering how civilians and combatants are mutually co-constituted by 
evolving interests and opportunities in violent processes. 
Beyond the structural effects of communication and political mobilization on social 
and political actors, violence plays an instrumental role in the relationship between guerrillas 
and the masses. A comparative analysis of Zimbabwe and El Salvador points to rebels’ use 
of violence against the population as an important intervening variable–a variable that 
mediates temporally or spatially between independent and dependent variables (George and 
Bennett 2005, 246-7). Rebel concerns about the vulnerability associated with abandoning 
armed struggle are attenuated by the movement’s continued use of violence. Like popular 
support for the rebels, the insurgents’ use of violent tactics varies with the war’s severity and 
the focus of the rebels’ strategy and across different locations. Violence in this sense should 
be understood as an instrument and part of a calculated rebel strategy to achieve a goal 
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(Lyons 2004, 51). Not only is the level of violence an indicator of the rebel-civilian 
relationship, but rebels’ exercise of violence is an endogenous mechanism that evolves under 
the influence of changing circumstances of conflict. 
Both the FMLN and the Zimbabwean guerrillas employed forced recruitment as part 
of their military strategies. The FMLN’s numerous human rights violations, widespread use 
of land mines toward the end of the war; and assassinations of an average of forty civilians 
per year between 1983 and 1990 point to its targeted use of violence against even its own 
constituents (McClintock 1998, 59-77). ZANU/ZAPU guerrillas employed coercion and 
violence against innocent civilians in securing territory and the liberation of delimited areas 
of the Rhodesian state. The rebels’ use of violence–particularly violent, protracted intra-rebel 
factional fighting–during and after the war exploited the profound cleavages in Zimbabwean 
society that were deepened by the conflict and continue to have negative implications for 
politics in Zimbabwe. The impact of an assured reliance on war veterans in the post-war 
period (Kriger 2003) on Mugabe’s decision to negotiate and enter politics is an understudied 
element of the Zimbabwean transition. 
How can the political system be changed to construct conditions amenable to rebel accession to 
 politics?  
Through the mutual co-constitution of agents and structures in civil war and efforts 
to negotiate an end to violence, alternatives and concessions are constructed on the 
battlefield and at the bargaining table. The interaction among warring actors who bring their 
ideas and interests to peace talks and external mediators who bring some normative 
conception of the means through which peace is achieved constitutes an evolving, shifting 
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target–as malleable interests and minimal commitments evolve, vulnerabilities increase and 
complete disarmament and political reform begin to appear daunting realities. Each party’s 
conception of defending its own stake is formed through their perceptions of the other’s 
interests and intentions. Combatants make their willingness to sacrifice lives for their causes 
clear through years of violent conflict; as they negotiate a settlement, their interests and 
identities are continually shaped by the social interactions of a new battlefield. This arena 
may allow for the possibility of institutional or electoral changes to the political system to 
secure an agreement on power-sharing or elections. 
Empirical evidence illustrates that the anticipation of relative gains won through 
negotiation and entry into political struggle influences actors’ decisions to revise their 
interests and disarm. If a rebel group negotiates an opportunity to secure a meaningful stake 
in government through electoral competition–often generated through alterations to the 
electoral system or the apportionment of legislative seats, or a guaranteed role in rewriting a 
constitution–it is likely to agree to enter the political ring, thereby changing the “rules of the 
game” and increasing its leverage indefinitely (Shugart 1992). 
The impact of the electoral system on rebels’ decisions to enter politics varies with 
the size and nature of the rebel group, its stated political objectives and the degree to which 
the preservation of the institutional status quo is in the interest of the régime. The FMLN 
sought changes to the electoral system throughout the 1980s; its goal was increased political 
inclusiveness and a universal right to representation in El Salvador. Early in the war when 
the rebels were focused on military strategy, FMLN leaders’ specific ideas about the group’s 
electoral prospects were less important than efforts to revolutionize the political system 
overall. Their focus changed when they realized that working for change within the 
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parameters of the existing system provided more strategic benefits–for example, 
international legitimacy–than continuing the conflict. In addition, some concessions from 
the government through negotiations seemed increasingly likely. The number of 
parliamentary seats increased from 60 to 84 and electoral policies were liberalized as a result 
of the peace agreement. The overall benefits perceived by the rebel movement of its re-
constitution as a legal, political actor in an internationally recognized, newly structured 
electoral system outweighed the risks of adherence to wringing greater concessions from the 
régime on electoral reform. The rebels’ anticipation of their legitimate role in the democratic 
consolidation of El Salvador was equally important in the strategic transition from violence 
to contentious politics. 
In Rhodesia in 1979, a crucial component to induce Mugabe and the rebels to 
participate fully in negotiations was allowing the guerrillas to benefit at the table from their 
distinct advantage over the régime on the battlefield. For Mugabe, the idea of the black 
majority gaining political power–particularly ZANU(PF)–was more important than the 
mechanisms of the electoral system through which “national liberation” occurred. From an 
institutionalist perspective, another electoral arrangement would have been more favorable 
to ZANU(PF) given its large size. Moreover, before the talks began at Lancaster House, 
Muzorewa and Nkomo each believed that his electoral victory was imminent–convictions in 
part engineered by the British. The rebels prioritized the legitimating potential of free and 
fair elections–an international norm of electoral democracy–over the benefits of specific 
electoral systems. 
While rationalist calculations about the opportunities and limitations of possible 
institutional reforms may define actors’ conceptions of their political opportunities, they 
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ultimately make decisions in a space constituted by ideational structures–their beliefs about 
their electoral prospects and popular support and their knowledge about the workings of the 
system. The roles adopted by agents–rebel and government parties, mediators and 
observers–in interactions at the negotiating table reinforce and reshape normative and 
ideational structures. If they reach an agreement, actors’ willingness to adhere to its 
provisions depend on the trust they have in institutions, the other parties and voters; agents’ 
identities and interests continue shaping their behavior. 
The potential to institute political reform shapes the environment in which actors 
engage, and the negotiating table becomes a space in which discussion about power-sharing 
and elections become possible. The system’s institutional character–for example whether a 
particular electoral system lends itself to participation by small or “outsider” parties–may 
impact the rebel group’s and regime’s considerations about entering politics. Institutional 
reforms may provide certain guarantees that the other side will not renege on its 
commitments. Through the mechanism of imagination (Reus-Smit 1996, 218-9), normative 
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Constructivism, civil conflict and rebellion-into-politics 
As an approach to social analysis, constructivism emphasizes the role of human 
consciousness in social life. The ideational factors that shape human interaction are most 
importantly, widely shared beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals (Finnemore et al, 
2001, 391). These “intersubjective” beliefs construct the interests of social actors. The 
interactions of agents–social actors–in political fora defined by peace, conflict, coexistence 
or low-level incompatibility–engender structures–ideas, culture, beliefs–that condition the 
interests and identities of the actors. The constructivist framework, then, affords an 
opportunity to understand a particular mode of agential interaction and change– transition 
from intrastate conflict. The study of civil war–gaining forceful momentum in line with its 
metastasis around the world–requires an understanding of the varied motivations of states 
and non-state actors, whose grievances, interests, objectives and identities are partially 
determined by their relationships to one another and to the environment in which they 
interact. 
Traditionally applied in political science to theoretical examinations of international 
society and relations among states, elements of the constructivist approach may be applied 
fruitfully to transitions from civil conflict. First, the identity of belligerents is transformed by 
their changing interests. For a non-state actor or the regime, perceptions of the potential 
advantages of giving up violent conflict–for instance, cutting military losses or acquiring 
assured political power through elections–shape its interests. The progression of the conflict 
has resulted in war weariness or improved relations with the voting public, and the regime’s 
or rebels’ preferences reflect these changed realities. Their interests become solidified as 
objectives at the bargaining table and shape the responses of the other party. In the process, 
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the identities of both parties to the conflict change; if they reach a settlement, they are no 
longer “enemies” but pledge to coexist in shared domestic political space. If a rebel group 
transforms into a party, it becomes a legitimate political actor with a reconstituted mandate 
and identity. 
Second, as a core assumption of constructivism, co-constitution of agents and 
structures in intrastate conflict plays out in civil conflicts and transitional periods in ways 
other than identity formation. Through interactions in the battles for ‘hearts and minds’ of 
civilians in cities and rural villages and for the changeable regional and international sources 
of support that combatants acquire, ideas drive agents, who shape beliefs and values through 
iterative practices and roles. The practices they carry out maintain and transform these 
structures (Reus-Smit, 1996, 218). For instance, the behavior of rebel and government 
parties in response to the actions of “spoilers”–different types of intransigent local actors 
who seek to disrupt or overturn peace processes through violent and non-violent means–or 
to the presence and behavior of an international mediator in talks between warring parties 
sustain the norms and ideas behind spoiler activity and the mediator’s interventions. 
Third, international norms have constraining and enabling effects on actors’ 
decisions to come to the table and on the outcomes of negotiation. The interest of the 
United Nations in constructing a successful peace-building model in Central American civil 
conflicts, particularly Guatemala–evident in its intricate, sustained involvement in 
negotiations and long-term verification role–coalesced with the government’s agenda of 
importing capitalism and gaining international market access and legitimacy. In the wake of 
disastrous failures in Rwanda and Somalia, the U.N. set out to succeed in constructing and 
monitoring peace in El Salvador and Guatemala. The Guatemalan government’s intentions 
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to avoid genuine engagement, “wait out the peace” and defeat the guerrilla coalition were 
buoyed by the long-term U.N. presence. Domestic agents in conflict transitions are shaped 
by the normative and ideational pressures and conditions of external involvement. 
Finally, while domestic-level political and social dynamics are the heart of civil wars, 
every intrastate conflict has international dimensions–whether manifest through the 
influence of international norms or external actors’ direct or indirect investment. 
Comparative politics and research methods may have implications for analyzing civil wars, as 
a constructivist analysis elicits. As Gourevitch’s seminal “second image reversed” illustrates, 
understanding the influence of international elements on domestic conditions is essential to 
theory-building in international relations and comparative politics. 
Civil war is a complex plane of interaction with spatial and temporal characteristics. 
Actors’ identities and interests change as they perceive the conflict, their advantages, 
shortcomings and “the enemy” differently over time. These ideational structures are not pre-
formed and cannot be taken for granted. Rebel groups, secessionist movements and ethnic 
insurgencies initiate conflict with the state for a variety of reasons that have much to do with 
the social, political and economic milieu which they inhabit and share. As conflict 
progresses, its dynamics shape the state response and rebel counter-reactions, and beliefs 
about what is possible and desirable change. The loci of violence in conflict–physical and 
psychological–develop and evolve as a result of interactions among participants in the 
conflict, whether civilians, insurgents or state security forces–at local, national and abstract 
levels. In this way, the decision of a rebel group to disarm and attempt to settle differences in 
the political sphere can be usefully examined through a constructivist lens. 
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Such a theoretical approach can simultaneously take into account the level of 
abstraction of conflict and its “on-the-ground” distribution of capabilities. The latter, 
material forces–in the form of actors’ military strength, economic resources and international 
support, for example–mold the dimensions of conflict, which form part of the social 
structure in which combatants and parties to negotiations interact. As Wendt points out, 
though “material conditions by themselves explain relatively little,” it is important to note 
that the ideational aspect of structure “supervenes on this material base” (Wendt 1999, 189). 
He concludes that a social system ultimately has a single structure, and understanding it 
requires taking both ideational and material elements into account (190). 
 
Violence and politics in civil war and implications for transitions 
Motivations are a complex factor in civil wars. As Kalyvas argues, actors cannot be 
treated as unitary. Multiple, sometimes contradictory allegiances feed conflict participants’ 
interests and actions. Moreover, motivations at local, “mass” levels often differ from the 
reasons for fighting at the central, “elite” level (Kalyvas 2003). This critical discrepancy and 
its manifestations at local levels–for example, a violent feud over land between two peasant 
communities that side with and harbor guerrilla forces, one of which later turns against the 
rebels, breeding local violence anew–suggests that complex motivations sustain cycles of 
violence that may appear as reflections of the larger government-guerrilla struggle. In this 
case, which occurred during Peru’s civil conflict, villagers exploited the opportunity that the 
larger war provided to carry out a private, local conflict–whether over natural resources, 
ethnicity or access to Sendero Luminoso rebels. 
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Uncovering peripheral conflicts within wider civil conflicts demands a revised 
orientation toward understanding civil wars and the opportunities and identities that they 
generate and perpetuate. Identity labels alone cannot be relied upon to characterize agents–
or their motives–in certain types of civil conflict. “Thus, we speak of actors such as Shias, 
Albanians, or workers following descriptions of civil wars along the ‘modular’ themes of 
religion, ethnicity or class” (Kalyvas 2003, 481). These loaded designations wrongly imply the 
“interchangeability” of actors who belong to a particular group–who become violent for a 
single cause and therefore can be substituted for any other member of their “grievance” 
group. Drawing theoretical conclusions as a result of these labels is misleading and results in 
overgeneralization. 
Studies of the causes of conflict and civil war termination–two areas on which much 
of the literature to date has focused–generally do not take into account complex causal 
mechanisms operating at local levels and the implications of their interactions with the 
overriding conflict environment. Not only are actors not unitary, they may reconstruct their 
identities and interests as opportunities in civil conflict permit. Campbell’s formulation of 
deconstruction as it relates to understanding civil war aims to illustrate how that which 
claims not to be produced has been produced. In his view, violence renders as natural that 
which is actually constructed; these imagined divisions in society have clear consequences for 
identity. The “performative constitution of identity” (Campbell 1998, 24) in turn embodies 
and generates conflict. 
Campbell’s argument is that focusing on the political consequences of particular 
“representations”–rather than on causality–is essential to an ethical understanding of the 
social world. An emphasis on particularity, in contrast to Hegel’s pursuit of the universal, is 
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useful to conceptualizing the importance of local forces at work in civil conflict that 
transcend the primary dichotomy of binary conflict data. In explaining why “local cleavages 
are neglected and local identities inferred from the larger conflict, Kalyvas points to “an 
epistemic preference for the universal over the particular” (2003, 480). A new research 
agenda for understanding civil wars must take into account the particularities of micro-level 
actions, conflicts and identities and their relationship to wider incompatibilities. 
Not all violence in civil wars is “political” (Kalyvas 2003, 476). Violence can be 
employed as an instrument of constructing identity further, and its use hardens 
representations of divisive lines of ethnic and religious identity and sovereignty. Violence 
becomes history, image, memory, and self-interested individuals draw on embedded ideas 
and traditions to perpetuate conflict. This is evident in the Israel-Palestinian conflict and in 
Afghanistan. Violence in this sense is inherent in identity formation.  
The varied, constructed identities formed during civil conflict are those that actors 
bring to the negotiation table in transitions to politics. As has been argued, these structures 
are subject to change through interaction. Studies of exits from violent internal conflict and 
entries into politics must take into account the varied identities and interests of actors–
whether rebel leaders, governments or civilians–and their impact on exacerbating conflict 






Implications for theorizing rebellion-into-politics and other transitions from conflict 
Civil War Analysis–Grasping for a False Dichotomy 
Outside of rationalist and constructivist considerations of the phenomenon, 
developing a theory of violent conflict remains difficult, not least because the nature of 
conflict is independent of the reasons for it (Addison 2002, 31). The inherent 
unpredictability of conflict eludes explanation or prediction. The instrumental role played by 
individual will in violent politics and conflict–“reflexivity” in the language of international 
relations theory–makes the tasks of defining and quantifying violence and building a model 
of violent conflict tenuous. 
As innumerable scholars have pointed out, the majority of wars are now civil wars. 
With the decline of “great power” wars, whether partially attributable to “democratic peace” 
or other shared norms, international conflicts may play out on domestic battlefields–both 
superimposed and interwoven into local, violent dynamics and economic, ethnic and 
religious divisions. Contentious politics displays patterns of alliances, identity formation and 
shifts, and reconstitution of domestic and international actors. Kalyvas gives voice to what 
may seem obvious: civil wars are “processes that provide a medium for a variety of 
grievances to be realized within the greater conflict, particularly through violence” (2003, 
479). Civil conflicts entail a combination of identities, actions and motivations (political and 
private, individual and collective); violence is never only spurred by economic or political 
considerations. Macro-level, quantitative studies of internal wars, while they have identified 
trends and transnational correlations among conflicts, employ insufficient measurements and 
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leave behind significant theoretical gaps. These analyses have limited the questions scholars 
have asked about civil war (Weinstein 2006, 366). 
In-depth qualitative research–what Kalyvas terms systematized analysis of “fine-
grained data”–and innovative theoretical approaches are needed to highlight causal processes 
and intervening mechanisms in civil conflicts. “Analytical and empirical disaggregation” of 
local-level dynamics and violence are imperative to differentiating cause, constitution and 
structural effects in internal war. The source of civil wars’ ambiguity and complexity is the 
interaction between center and periphery. (2003, 476, emphasis added). As methodological 
approaches evolve to examine ontological complexity, a greater number of political scientists 
will take on the task of theorizing change in civil war. 
A constructivist approach to the analysis of civil wars may spur scholars to use 
comparative research tools (Finnemore 2001, 404-5). These methods emphasize qualitative, 
case study based analysis, interpretive methods and fieldwork. Understanding interactions 
rather than quantities is critical to studying the dynamic of violence in civil wars–the 
“mechanisms and processes that drive contention” (Tarrow 2007, 596). Qualitative methods 
may help identify key actors and alliances and determine which competing mechanisms are 
most salient. Employing within-case analysis, process-tracing and narrative may help reorient 
explanations of internal conflict from episodes to mechanisms and processes (McAdam et al, 
2001, 309-10). “Explanation consists of identifying crucial mechanisms and their 
combinations into transforming processes” (310). Large-n quantitative analyses of civil wars 
do not permit the intricate methods that this sort of explanation demands. 
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Approximating the ideational and normative dynamics of civil war transitions and their 
complex agents may require techniques that comparative scholars recommend. The study of 
actors’ decision-making in transitions from violent conflict suggests a redirected approach to 
deconstructing civil war and the processes that mitigate, terminate and resolve these forms 
of conflict. A systematic, empirical approach to civil wars through specification of causal 
mechanisms will improve theoretical analyses–and perhaps the willingness of scholars to 
tackle these types of conflicts. 
When today’s social science has become intellectual history, one question 
will certainly be asked about it: why did social science, which has produced so 
many studies of so many subjects, produce so few on violent political disorder–
internal war?... [B]y any common-sense reckoning the contemporary literature 
should be brimming over with such studies. (Eckstein quoted in O’Leary et al, 
2007, 1) 
 
Roland Paris argued in 2001 that the study of peace operations, traditionally guided by a 
search for policy-relevant “lessons learned” and the pursuit of micro-theory, is 
fundamentally missing a crucial element: macro-theory (2001, 30-31). Establishing a 
relationship between peace operations and the central theoretical debates of international 
relations would have promising benefits for students of both. Similarly, a dialogue among 
comparative and IR scholars and with other social science disciplines would prove fruitful to 
the next step in the study of violence and change in civil wars. Examining conflict dynamics 
through a constructivist lens is one proposed means to elicit a conceptualization of the 
structural effects of norms and identities in internal conflict and their implications for 
understanding micro- and macro-level processes. The linkages between studies of transitions 
from civil war and theoretical controversies in international relations are clear and many–
involving the role of international norms, state sovereignty, and the interaction between 
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domestic and international politics. Constructing a process-centered methodological 
approach to studying conflict that transcends disciplines may provide international relations 
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